The Advent of State and Local Lobby Regulations and the Legal and Ethical Considerations for Attorneys. by Fischer, Ross & Gullahorn, Jack
St. Mary's Journal on Legal Malpractice & 
Ethics 
Volume 3 Number 1 Article 2 
1-1-2013 
The Advent of State and Local Lobby Regulations and the Legal 
and Ethical Considerations for Attorneys. 
Ross Fischer 
Jack Gullahorn 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.stmarytx.edu/lmej 
 Part of the Law and Society Commons, Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility Commons, and 
the State and Local Government Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Ross Fischer & Jack Gullahorn, The Advent of State and Local Lobby Regulations and the Legal and 
Ethical Considerations for Attorneys., 3 ST. MARY'S JOURNAL ON LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS 32 (2013). 
Available at: https://commons.stmarytx.edu/lmej/vol3/iss1/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the St. Mary's Law Journals at Digital Commons at St. 
Mary's University. It has been accepted for inclusion in St. Mary's Journal on Legal Malpractice & Ethics by an 
authorized editor of Digital Commons at St. Mary's University. For more information, please contact 
sfowler@stmarytx.edu, jcrane3@stmarytx.edu. 




Ross Fischer | Jack Gullahorn  
The Advent of State and Local Lobby Regulations and the 
Legal and Ethical Considerations for Attorneys 
Abstract.  Advocacy is the primary goal and responsibility of two distinct 
and well-regulated professions: the lawyer and the lobbyist, each of whom is 
subject to his own set of rules and regulations.  This Article is designed to 
analyze the intersection of the lawyer’s Disciplinary Code with developing 
rules governing advocacy in the policy-making arenas throughout Texas.  
Increasingly, the line between legal and legislative advocacy has become 
blurred as more local Texas entities turn to state lobby regulations for 
inspiration.  This Article will consider the state Lobby Law, including its 
history and structure, as a framework for subsequent efforts to regulate 
lobbying and will identify the common elements of lobby regulation systems, 
with a particular focus on their treatment of attorneys.  It will also analyze 
how, at every level in Texas, the rules of engagement regarding 
communication and advocacy are being imposed with varying and significant 
consequences for attorneys, with a particular emphasis on how local 
governmental entities are literally rewriting those rules of engagement.  
Finally, this Article will analyze the potential consequences for all who 
advocate before governmental entities and attempt to influence public 
servants, including criminal and ethical issues, with a particular focus on 
attorneys engaged in lobbying.  As local lobby regulations become more 
common, attorneys dealing with local governments will be forced to examine 
the fundamental aspects of the legal practice, including the structure of the 
representation, the nature of advocacy and communication, and the meaning 
of confidentiality. 
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“Those who do not use local guides cannot take advantage of the ground.” 
Sun Tzu, The Art of War1 
I.     INTRODUCTION 
The world is shaped primarily by decisions made by us or for us in 
almost every aspect of our lives.  These decisions, made through the 
process of advocacy, influence both the mundane and routine parts of our 
daily lives and impart a critical and long-term impact on life itself. 
The professional world of governmental advocacy is a major player in 
the realm of decision-making.  Given the importance of such decisions, it 
is not surprising that citizens seek to influence them.  This Article focuses 
on legal intricacies regarding lobbying, or communicating to influence 
decisions.  Lobbying exists at every level of government and has influenced 
 
1. SUN TZU, THE ART OF WAR 167 (Thomas Cleary, trans., Shambhala Publ’ns, Inc. 2000) 
(c. 2 B.C.E.). 
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the legislative branch throughout history.2  Regulation differs significantly 
by venue, from the highly regulated and transparent to a complete lack of 
structured regulation.  In Texas, the regulation of lobbyists at the state 
level evolved from an outright prohibition with criminal penalties to a 
well-regulated system of registration, reporting, administrative rules, and 
interpretive guidance (although some violations still carry criminal 
penalties). 
Traditional legal work in which licensed professionals are paid to advise, 
strategize, interpret, and advocate is subject to specific rules and 
regulations.  In a legislative setting, however, those same behaviors have 
historically been forbidden, and more recently regulated with an emphasis 
on disclosure.  The behaviors that come naturally to the advocate trained 
in the law have transitioned from being strictly prohibited to being the 
subject of mandatory disclosure when the advocate is acting as a lobbyist. 
Increasingly, more local governments—mostly municipalities—are 
adopting local ethics regulations to govern the conduct of officers, 
employees, and those seeking to do business with local governments.  
These regulations, which have historically focused on the conduct of 
elected and appointed officials, are expanding to include local lobbying 
regulations.  The local rules include standards for determining who 
qualifies as a local lobbyist, registration requirements, mandatory periodic 
reporting, and limitations on behavior intended to influence decision 
makers.  Throughout Texas, local governmental entities are literally 
rewriting the rules of engagement regarding communication and advocacy 
with varying and significant consequences for attorneys. 
It is difficult to discern how, if at all, the evolution of state-level lobby 
regulations, and the advent of lobby rules at the local level, were influenced 
by the ethical standards imposed upon the legal profession.  Lawyers have 
long been subject to rules designed to ensure the integrity of the legal 
profession.  These standards, currently codified in the Texas Disciplinary 
Rules of Professional Conduct, address many of the same concepts as 
lobbying rules. 
This Article is designed to analyze the intersection of the lawyer’s 
Disciplinary Code with developing rules governing advocacy in the policy-
making arenas throughout Texas.  It will consider the state Lobby Law—
including its history and structure—as a framework for subsequent efforts 
 
2. See Peter Grier, The Lobbyist Through History: Villainy and Virtue, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE 
MONITOR (Sept. 28, 2009), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/2009/0928/the-lobbyist-
through-history-villainy-and-virtue (“Congress has always had, and always will have, lobbyists and 
lobbying.” (quoting Senator Byrd (D) of West Virginia during a 1987 floor speech)). 
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to regulate lobbying.  The common elements of lobby regulation systems 
will be identified, with a particular focus on the impact on lawyer–
lobbyists.  Finally, this Article will analyze the consequences, both criminal 
and ethical, affecting those who advocate before governmental entities and 
attempt to influence public servants, with an emphasis on attorneys 
engaged in lobbying.  As a result of expanding local lobby regulations, 
attorneys involved with local governments reexamine fundamental aspects 
of the legal practice, such as the structure of representation, the nature of 
advocacy and communication, and the meaning of confidentiality. 
II.     THE REGULATION OF LOBBYISTS BY THE STATE OF TEXAS 
Today in Texas, lobbying the legislature is a well-regulated profession.  
This was not always the case.  In the early 1900s, lobbying was a crime:  
That if any paid or employed agent, representative or attorney of any person, 
association or corporation, shall, at any place in this state, after the election 
and during the term of office of any member of the Legislature of this state, 
privately solicit the vote, or privately endeavor to exercise any influence, or 
offer anything of value or any other inducements whatever, to any such 
member of the Legislature, to influence his action concerning any measure 
then pending or thereafter to be introduced, in either branch of the 
Legislature of this State, he shall be deemed guilty of lobbying.3  
A person convicted of lobbying faced a “fine of not less than two hundred 
dollars nor more than two thousand dollars” and imprisonment between 
six months and two years.4 
This lobbying prohibition was central to some noteworthy Texas 
contract cases of the early twentieth century.  In Graves & Houtchens v. 
Diamond Hill Independent School District,5 decided in 1922, a Texas 
appellate court cited this penal provision, among a litany of persuasive 
authorities from across the country, to nullify a contract for lobby 
services.6  The Diamond Hill Independent School District retained Graves 
& Houtchens to advocate for the defeat of pending legislation, the passage 
of which would have hindered the district’s taxing authority.7  The firm 
 
3. Act to Define and Punish Lobbying, 30th Leg., R.S., ch. 79, § 2, 1907 Tex. Gen. Laws 162, 
163, repealed by Representation Before the Legislature Act, 55th Leg., 1st C.S., ch. 9, 1957 Tex. Gen. 
Laws 17. 
4. Id. § 4. 
5. Graves & Houtchens v. Diamond Hill Indep. Sch. Dist., 243 S.W. 638 (Tex. Civ. App.—
Fort Worth 1922, no writ). 
6. Id. at 639–40. 
7. Id. at 638 (claiming the passage of a proposed bill would diminish the school district’s taxing 
ability). 
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entreated lawmakers to kill the legislation on a contingent fee basis, taking 
credit for its ultimate demise.8  However, when the district refused to pay 
the agreed sum of $890, the firm sued the district.9  In reviewing the 
matter, the court held that a contract to influence privately the outcome of 
legislation was void as a matter of law and public policy.10  Among the 
many authorities cited by the court was Williston on Contracts, opining, 
“[A]n agreement by a legislator to exercise his judgment in a particular way 
is not binding at law.  His promise, if without consideration, is not 
binding for that reason, and if he bargains for consideration it is illegal.”11 
Davis v. Texas Farm Bureau Cotton Association12 involved an attorney 
(and former legislator) who was retained by an association to represent its 
interests before the legislature.13  Initially paid $500 for two days of work, 
the lawyer testified before committees regarding the bill his client was 
interested in and provided committee members with requested 
information.14  However, his stay in Austin and the scope of his advocacy 
grew greater than originally envisioned, stretching to a twelve-day stay and 
resulting in a contractual fee dispute.15  During the course of the 
representation, the attorney conversed with many of his former colleagues 
both socially and regarding the bill his client was interested in.16  The 
attorney admitted that he dined with some of them, but adamantly denied 
that he sought private meetings with them for the purpose of influencing 
their votes; rather, he testified the exchanges were initiated by the 
legislators and that he merely answered their questions.17  After the hired 
advocate brought suit for his fees, the association alleged in its defense that 
the attorney privately solicited the votes of legislators, which violated the 
 
8. Id. (citing the firm’s claim that “had it not been for their influence and efforts, . . . 
[lawmakers] would have voted favorably” for the bill). 
9. Id. 
10. Id. at 639. 
11. 3 SAMUEL WILLISTON, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1727 (1920); see Davis v. Tex. Farm 
Bureau Cotton Ass’n, 62 S.W.2d 90, 96 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1933) (“Personal influence exerted over 
the individual members of a Legislature will vitiate a contract, the consideration of which is the 
procurement of legislative action.  Such a contract should be held void though there is no actual 
corruption in the particular case.  Although the contract may not expressly provide for personal 
solicitation it will be declared illegal if it appears that in carrying out the contract it is necessary to 
resort to ‘lobbying’ . . . .”). 
12. Davis v. Tex. Farm Bureau Cotton Ass’n, 62 S.W.2d 90 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1933). 
13. Id. at 91. 
14. Id. at 92–93. 
15. Id. 
16. Id. at 94. 
17. Id. 
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criminal prohibition on lobbying.18 
In its decision, the court found that even an appeal to a legislator’s 
reason, if made privately by a paid agent, falls within the purview of the 
statute.19  “Whenever any such paid or employed representative goes 
beyond the limitations of the statute and singles out individual legislators, 
privately, and either by argument or otherwise endeavors to influence their 
action, he transgresses the law, however fair in intent he may be.”20  The 
court ruled that personal influence exerted over individual legislators 
violated the lobby law, thereby vitiating a contract for otherwise lawful 
advocacy.21  The court’s holding clarified that mal-intent was not required 
on the part of the lobbyist; rather, it held the contract was unenforceable 
because of its “tendency to be injurious to the public.”22 
The penalty for violation of the lobbying prohibition was substantial—a 
monetary fine of $200 to $2,000 and possible jail time of six months to 
two years—but there is no record of it ever being enforced.23  Indeed, the 
two reported cases both dealt with civil suits filed by the lobbyist to 
enforce payment of their fees.24 
The first significant change in the regulatory scheme governing lobbying 
occurred in 1937 when the Texas House adopted rules requiring persons 
testifying before house committees to register and provide certain 
information before testifying.25 
 
18. Id. at 93–95 (summarizing parts of the defendant’s testimony containing allegations of 
lobbying on behalf of the association by Mr. Davis). 
19. Id. at 95.  The Davis court first considered Article 179 of the lobbying statute and 
concluded that while that particular provision permits persons with a direct interest in the pending 
measure to attempt to influence the members of the legislature; however, that influence was limited 
to appeals to reason.  Id.  It then considered Article 180, which applied to “paid agents, 
representatives, and attorneys” and prohibited any attempt to influence legislators, including by 
appeal to reason.  Id. 
20. Id. at 96. 
21. Id. (“Although the contract may not expressly provide for personal solicitation it will be 
declared illegal if it appears that in carrying out the contract it is necessary to resort to 
‘lobbying’ . . . .”). 
22. Id. at 97. 
23. Cf. Act to Define and Punish Lobbying, 30th Leg., R.S., ch. 79, § 4, 1907 Tex. Gen. Laws 
162, 163 (providing a monetary fine and jail time for violation of lobbying statute) (repealed 1957). 
24. See Davis, 62 S.W.2d at 91 (initiating suit to collect fees for lobbying services); Graves & 
Houtchens v. Diamond Hill Indep. Sch. Dist., 243 S.W. 638, 638 (Tex. Civ. App.—Fort Worth 
1922, no writ) (attempting to recover remaining balance on lobbying fees). 
25. Tex. H.R. Rule 7 § 41, H.S.R. 9, 54th Leg., R.S., 1955 H.J. of Tex. 16, reprinted in Rules 
of the House, Texas Legislative Manual 175–76 (1955). 
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A. History 
1. 1957 
Although the adoption of the 1937 House Rules was significant, the real 
precursor to the present day law on lobbying was the 1957 passage of the 
Representation Before the Legislature Act (S.B. 2).26  This legislation 
repealed all of the 1907 Penal Code provisions criminalizing the practice of 
lobbying and replaced them with a registration statute that required those 
who engage in “direct communications” to register with the Secretary of 
State and report their clients as well as expenditures on lobbying efforts.27  
However, the revision to the statutes did not completely broaden the 
permissible activities of persons engaged in lobbying. 
The definition of direct communication in S.B. 2 allowed not only 
personal appearance before a legislative committee, but also the following:  
[P]ersonal contact or communication with any member of the Legislature for 
the purpose of explaining, discussing, or arguing for or against pending or 
proposed legislation or any action thereon by the Legislature, the Governor 
or the Lieutenant Governor during a session of the Legislature, to argue for 
or against pending legislation or any action thereon by the Legislature, the 
Governor, or the Lieutenant Governor.28  
No longer were paid agents, representatives, or attorneys prohibited from 
privately soliciting the vote of legislators or privately attempting to exercise 
any influence over them.29  Additionally, the new law required lobbyists 
to report expenditures and register with the state if those expenditures 
exceeded fifty dollars.30 
Offsetting this seemingly broad provision was the retention of the 
 
26. Representation Before the Legislature Act, 55th Leg., 1st C.S., ch. 9, 1957 Tex. Gen. Laws 
17, repealed by Lobby Control Act, 63d Leg., R.S., ch. 422, 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws 1096, repealed by 
Act of Sept. 1, 1985, 69th Leg., R.S., ch. 479, § 224, 1985 Tex. Gen. Laws 1652, 1719. 
27. Id. § 3, 1957 Tex. Gen. Laws 17, 18. 
28. Id. § 2(e), 1957 Tex. Gen. Laws 17, 17. 
29. Id. 
30. Id. § 3(c), 1957 Tex. Gen. Laws 17, 18 (providing that a person with expenditures of more 
than $50 must register and report such expenditures).  While not reaching the level of regulation that 
legislative contact reporting required, the 1957 legislation also initiated, for the first time, a 
requirement that practitioners before state agencies sign a register at the state agency whenever they 
contacted any state employee or official.  Act of Dec. 2, 1957, 55th Leg., 1st C.S., ch. 9, § 2, 1957 
Tex. Gen. Laws 30, 30 (requiring registration of “every person appearing before a state agency or 
contacting in person any officer or employee thereof on behalf of any other person, firm, partnership, 
corporation[,] or association”).  This provision can now be found in similar form in Chapter 2004 of 
the Texas Government Code, but without the central filing requirement.  TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. 
ch. 2004 (West 2008). 
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limitation initially found in Article 179 of the early Penal Code that 
prohibited influencing “the vote of any member of the Legislature or the 
Lieutenant Governor or the approval or veto of the Governor on any 
pending legislation other than by an appeal to reason.”31  Ostensibly, this 
provision would still prohibit attempts to influence by means viewed as less 
than direct. 
2. 1973 
Following the Sharpstown Scandal of 1971,32 which led to the 
replacement of a majority of members of the legislature in the 1972 
elections, the Legislature passed the Lobby Control Act (H.B. 2).  Its 
passage repealed the 1957 Representation Before the Legislature Act and 
created the state’s first full lobby registration law.33  The Act required 
registration with the secretary of state by persons compensated for or 
making certain expenditures when communicating directly with the 
legislative or executive branch to influence legislation.34  Considerably 
pared down from its initial introduced version,35 the final bill retained 
much of the registration framework that served as the basis for the current 
law.36  Significantly, the “appeal to reason” language was excluded, 
thereby eliminating the final barrier to private communications and 
expenditures for non-substantive lobby contacts.37  In place of the 
excluded language was a mechanism and requirement for reporting 
expenditures and public disclosure of client information.38 
 
31. Representation Before the Legislature Act, 55th Leg., 1st C.S., ch. 9, § 11, 1957 Tex. Gen. 
Laws 17, 19 (emphasis added) (repealed 1973). 
32. See Sam Kinch, Jr., Sharpstown Stock-Fraud Scandal, TEX. ST. HIST. ASS’N, 
http://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/online/articles/mqs01 (last visited May 9, 2013) (discussing the 
infamous scandal involving state officials who made “profitable quick-turnover bank-financed stock 
purchases in return for the passage of legislation desired by the financier”). 
33. Lobby Control Act, 63d Leg., R.S., ch. 422, 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws 1096, repealed by Act of 
Sept. 1, 1985, 69th Leg., R.S., ch. 479, § 224, 1985 Tex. Gen. Laws 1652, 1719. 
34. Id. § 3, 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws 1096, 1097. 
35. Compare Comm. on State Affairs, Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B. 2, 63d Leg., R.S. (1973) 
(containing several classes for registration, such as employees of those who influence legislation), with 
Lobby Control Act, 63d Leg., R.S., ch. 422, 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws 1096 (containing only two classes 
for registration) (repealed 1985). 
36. See generally TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 305.003 (West Supp. 2012) (resembling the 
registration provisions of the Lobby Control Act). 
37. Compare Representation Before the Legislature Act, 55th Leg., 1st C.S., ch. 9, § 11, 1957 
Tex. Gen. Laws 17, 20 (maintaining early Penal Code language on “appeal to reason”) (repealed 
1973), with Lobby Control Act, 63d Leg., R.S., ch. 422, 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws 1096 (lacking the 
language of “appeal to reason”) (repealed 1985). 
38. See Lobby Control Act, 63d Leg., R.S., ch. 422, §§ 5–6, 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws 1096, 
1097–98 (describing registration and the information to be disclosed) (repealed 1985). 
FISCHER_FINAL 6/3/2013  10:54 AM 
2013] The Advent of State and Local Lobby Regulations 41 
3. 1991 
The progression of Texas statutes from prohibiting to regulating the 
conduct of lobbyists was muddled by difficult and sometimes conflicting 
statutory requirements and regulatory exceptions. 
However, the Lobby Control Act of 1973 established a framework for 
local lobby ordinances that followed.  These notable frames included the 
triggering mechanisms of communication, compensation, and 
expenditures, the addition of disclosure requirements, as well as the 
enumeration of certain exceptions.39  Almost twenty years later, the 
current Texas Lobby Law was passed on the heels of a media uproar after 
poultry magnate Lonnie “Bo” Pilgrim handed out $10,000 campaign 
contributions on the senate floor during a debate on workers 
compensation legislation in which he had a strong interest.40 
The 72nd Legislature passed two significant measures to set the stage for 
future ethics regulation in Texas.  The first was the passage of Senate Joint 
Resolution 8, a constitutional amendment that established the Texas 
Ethics Commission, which was adopted by the voters on November 5, 
1991.41  The second was the passage of Senate Bill 1, the implementing 
legislation for the yet-to-be adopted constitutional amendment.42  This 
legislation effected revisions to existing lobby law and regulated 
communications with all state-level officials and employees, including, for 
the first time, communications designed to influence the outcome of 
administrative actions.43  The reforms, however, did not reach officials 
below the state level, nor did they reach federal activities or the state 
judiciary.44  Unlike other states that have extended lobby laws to local 
 
39. See generally id. § 3, 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws 1096, 1097 (regulating activities based on 
communication, compensation, and expenditures) (repealed 1985). 
40. See Texas Businessman Hands Out $10,000 Checks in State Senate, N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 
1989), http://www.nytimes.com/1989/07/09/us/texas-businessman-hands-out-10000-checks-in-state 
-senate.html (reporting on Lonnie Pilgrim’s contributions).  See generally Act of Jan. 1, 1992, 72d 
Leg., R.S., ch. 304, 1991 Tex. Gen. Laws 1290 (chronicling amendments and expansions on then-
existing lobby laws), amended by Act of Sept. 1, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 996, § 4.03, 1995 Tex. 
Gen. Laws 4999 (current version at GOV’T § 305.003 (West Supp. 2012)). 
41. Tex. S.J. Res. 8, 72d Leg., R.S., 1991 Tex. Gen. Laws 3520, 3520–21 (amending the 
Constitution to create the Texas Ethics Commission); see TEX. CONST. art. III, § 24a (providing for 
the Texas Ethics Commission). 
42. Act of Jan. 1, 1992, 72d Leg., R.S., ch. 304, § 2.06, 1991 Tex. Gen. Laws 1290, 1308, 
amended by Act of Sept. 1, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 996, § 2, 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 4999, 5000 
(current version at GOV’T § 305.005 (West Supp. 2012)). 
43. Id. § 2.03, 1991 Tex. Gen. Laws 1290, 1304–05, amended by Act of Sept. 1, 1995, 74th 
Leg., R.S., ch. 996, § 4.03. 
44. Id. 
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public sector officials and servants,45 Texas has not addressed lobbying at 
the local level; instead, it has relied on prohibitions in the Texas Penal 
Code and piecemeal restrictions at the local level. 
4. 2003 
In 2002, for the first time since its creation, the Texas Ethics 
Commission endured the scrutiny of the Texas Sunset Commission, 
leading to the generation of legislation that would subject the Commission 
to oversight.46  The law regulating lobbyists was basically left intact, other 
than changes to expenditure reporting47 and conflict of interest rules,48 
which clarified its application to both lawyers and non-lawyers.49 
B. Current Code 
1. Chapter 305 of the Government Code 
Texas lobbying regulations are primarily located in Chapter 305 of the 
Government Code and in the rules adopted by the Texas Ethics 
Commission pursuant to Chapter 305.50  This statute and the applicable 
rules will be referred to collectively as the “Lobby Law.”  Some provisions 
of Chapter 305 apply to all members of the public, as well as all state 
employees, and not merely to registrants under the Code.51  Generally, 
 
45. See, e.g., N.Y. LEGIS. LAW art. 1-A, § 1-c (McKinney 2008) (applying to the passage of 
local laws). 
46. See Act of Sept. 1, 2003, 78th Leg., R.S., ch. 249, § 1.02, 2003 Tex. Gen. Laws 1123, 
1123 (making the Texas Ethics Commission subject to oversight), amended by Act of June 17, 2011, 
82d Leg., R.S., ch. 1232, § 1.03, 2011 Tex. Gen. Laws 3278, 3278 (current version at GOV’T 
§ 571.022 (West Supp. 2012)). 
47. See id. § 4.06, 2003 Tex. Gen. Laws 1123, 1147 (changing disclosures), amended by Act 
Relating to Reporting of Expenditures by Persons Registered As Lobbyists, 79th Leg., R.S., ch. 206, 
§ 2, 2005 Tex. Gen. Laws 366, 367 (current version at GOV’T § 305.0061 (West Supp. 2012)). 
48. See id. § 4.08, 2003 Tex. Gen. Laws 1123, 1148–49 (altering the meaning of a conflict of 
interest), amended by Act Relating to Prohibited Conflicts of Interest of Registered Lobbyists, 79th 
Leg., R.S., ch. 218, §§ 1, 3, 2005 Tex. Gen. Laws 382, 382–83 (current version at GOV’T § 305.028 
(West Supp. 2012)). 
49. The provisions of the lobby law conflicts statute, while patterned after the conflicts 
language contained in 1.04 of the Texas Disciplinary Rules, is in some ways more encompassing than 
the provisions traditionally applied to lawyers.  The lawyer–lobbyist is governed by and subject to 
both provisions. 
50. See GOV’T ch. 305 (West 2005 & Supp. 2012) (putting forth lobby regulations); 1 TEX. 
ADMIN. CODE ch. 34 (2012) (Tex. Ethics Comm’n, Regulation of Lobbyists) (providing further 
regulation). 
51. Compare GOV’T § 305.003 (West Supp. 2012) (referring to persons required to register, 
defined as “registrants” in section 305.002(9) of the Texas Government Code), with id. § 305.002(8) 
(referring generally to persons, defined as “an individual, corporation, association, firm, partnership, 
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however, the provisions apply to those individuals or entities required to 
register under Chapter 305 and Chapter 34 of the Commission rules.52  It 
is important to note that the term “registrant” means anyone required to 
register as a lobbyist, including both those that have properly registered 
and those that should have registered, but have failed to do so.53  While 
entities are considered persons under the Code and are required to register, 
they may avoid registration if an associated lobbyist reports the income or 
expenditures that the entity would otherwise have to report.54 
There is no statutory or regulatory definition of “lobbyist,” but the 
requisite analysis begins with a parsing of what it means to communicate.  
The key element that must exist before registration is required is that a 
person must “communicate directly with one or more members of the 
legislative or executive branch to influence legislation or administrative 
action.”55  To communicate means to “contact in person or by telephone, 
telegraph, letter, facsimile, electronic mail, or other electronic means of 
communication.”56  Through its advisory opinions, the Texas Ethics 
Commission has determined that “goodwill communications,” which may 
not even reference a client’s interest or request any active consideration, are 
considered direct communications that trigger a registration 
determination.57  Goodwill is considered a communication “to generate or 
maintain goodwill for the purpose of influencing potential future 
legislation” or administrative action.58 
Once a person is deemed to have communicated pursuant to Chapter 
305, there are two statutory thresholds that determine whether registration 
is required.  The operative terminology in the Lobby Law is that once a 
person directly communicates to influence legislation or administrative 
 
committee, club, organization, or group of persons who are voluntarily acting in concert”). 
52. See id. § 305.0021 (governing a registrant and his agent); 1 ADMIN. § 34.81 (2012) (Tex. 
Ethics Comm’n, Election to File Annually) (addressing the activity report of a registrant). 
53. See GOV’T § 305.002(9) (defining registrant as a person who must register under section 
305.003). 
54. See id. § 305.002 (defining registrant to include entities); 1 ADMIN. § 34.45 (2012) (Tex. 
Ethics Comm’n, Entity Registration) (authorizing this exception to entity registration). 
55. GOV’T § 305.003; 1 ADMIN. § 34.41 (2012) (Tex. Ethics Comm’n, Expenditure 
Threshold). 
56. GOV’T § 305.002; 1 ADMIN. § 34.1 (2012) (Tex. Ethics Comm’n, Definitions). 
57. See Tex. Ethics Comm’n Op. No. 94, at 1 (1992) (paying travel expenses required 
registration); Tex. Ethics Comm’n Op. No. 90, at 2 (1992) (making a deer lease available for trips is 
communication); Tex. Ethics Comm’n Op. No. 89, at 3 (1992) (holding there could be direct 
communication during a hunting trip); Tex. Ethics Comm’n Op. No. 34, at 1 (1992) (hosting 
parties requires registration). 
58. Tex. Ethics Comm’n Op. No. 467, at 1 (2006). 
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action, he, she, or it59 triggers a need to determine if one of the thresholds 
requiring registration has been crossed. 
The first type of threshold is based on expenditures made for the 
practice of lobbying.  Once a person communicates directly, she must 
consider the current calendar quarter and determine if she has spent $500 
or more in certain reportable lobby expenditures.60  If she has, then she 
must register.61 
The second type of threshold is tied to the amount of compensation 
received for lobby activities.  A person paid or expected to be paid $1,000 
or more in a calendar quarter is required to register when communicating 
directly to influence legislation or the outcome of any administrative 
action.62  The term legislation is defined broadly in the Code63 so it 
becomes difficult to envision any matter that would not fit into the 
definition.  The definition of administrative action is equally broad: 
“‘Administrative action’ means rulemaking, licensing, or any other matter 
that may be the subject of action by a state agency or executive branch 
office . . . includ[ing] the proposal, consideration, or approval of the 
matter or negotiations concerning the matter.”64 
 
59. GOV’T § 305.002 (including entities in the Lobby Law definition of person). 
60. See id. § 305.003 (deferring the amount of expenditure to commission rule);  1 ADMIN. 
§ 34.41 (making $500 the minimum expenditure).  The $500 requisite does not include personal 
expenses for travel, food or lodging.  GOV’T § 305.003(a)(1).  The Texas Government Code states 
that the minimum statutory amount will be $200, but defers to the Commission to set any amount 
above that.  Id. 
61. GOV’T § 305.003(a)(1) (authorizing the Ethics Commission to set the amount); 1 ADMIN. 
§ 34.41(a) (2012) (Tex. Ethics Comm’n, Expenditure Threshold) (requiring registration if 
expenditures exceed $500).  The Commission has set the compensation threshold at $1,000, but 
retains the power to change that amount by rule.  GOV’T§ 305.003(a)(2); 1 ADMIN. § 34.43(a) 
(2012) (Tex. Ethics Comm’n, Compensation and Reimbursement Threshold). 
62. GOV’T § 305.003(a)(2); 1 ADMIN. § 34.43(a). 
63. GOV’T § 305.002(6). 
64. Id. § 305.002(1) (defining administrative action).  The potential of requiring lobby 
registration for everyone in the state who was paid a minimal sum over a calendar quarter to 
communicate with any state level official or employee was so broad that the original working group 
convened to assist with the implementation of the new law recommended a rulemaking to address 
the issue.  See 21 Tex. Reg. 11820 (1996) (codified at 1 ADMIN. § 34.43) (adopting the 5% 
provision).  Thus was born the “5% rule.”  1 ADMIN. § 34.43.  Once communication occurs, 
triggering possible registration, individuals must then determine if they have been compensated more 
than $1,000 in that quarter.  Id.  If so, they must register if they have spent 5% or more of their 
compensated time communicating or preparing to communicate during the same quarter.  See id. 
(accounting for communication and the preparation to communicate).  The Ethics Commission 
adopted a rule defining the elements of preparation time to consider in the calculation of 5%.  Id. 
§ 34.3 (Tex. Ethics Comm’n, Compensation for Preparation Time).  In short, anything done to 
bring a person up to speed, educate, refresh, strategize, or other background preparation for 
communication counts toward the 5% threshold.  See id. (describing preparations to communicate).  
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2. Exceptions 
Despite the broad definition of actions that trigger the registration 
requirements, the legislature has statutorily provided numerous 
exceptions.65  The most prevalent statutory exceptions to the registration 
requirements include exceptions for: (1) those individuals whose influential 
communication with the legislature or executive branch involves “an 
appearance before or testimony . . . in a hearing conducted by or on behalf 
of either the legislative or the executive branch and who does not receive 
special or extra compensation for the appearance other than actual 
expenses incurred in attending the hearing;”66 and (2) written 
communications by an attorney of record in a docketed case before a state 
agency.67  The statute also recognizes that certain individuals attempting 
to influence state purchasing decisions warrant exemption from the 
registration requirements.68  Consequently, communications regarding 
certain agency purchasing decisions may be exempt depending on the 
monetary value of the procurement, whether the person attempting to 
influence the sale is an employee or a contractor, and whether the 
compensation to be paid is on a contingency basis.69 
In addition to the statutory exceptions, the Texas Ethics Commission, 
by rule, has established exceptions to the compensation threshold.70  
Certain exceptions are particularly relevant for practicing lawyers.  For 
example, communicating with state personnel or providing testimony in 
connection with an adjudicative proceeding or litigation does not trigger 
registration, nor do communications relating to an agency’s rulemaking 
process.71 
These triggers, thresholds, and exceptions are important to understand 
because they serve as the basis for most of the local lobby ordinances 
subsequently discussed in this Article. 
Unanswered—and to date unasked—questions remain in the discussion 
of the implications of registration provisions on non-typical state entities.  
 
The 5% threshold also includes time spent engaging in goodwill communications.  See id. (counting 
time used to influence legislation). 
65. See, e.g., GOV’T § 305.004 (West 2005) (enumerating exceptions from the registration 
requirements of Chapter 305). 
66. Id. § 305.004(2). 
67. Id. § 305.003(c) (West Supp. 2012). 
68. Id. § 305.0041(a). 
69. Id. § 304.0041(a). 
70. TEX. ETHICS COMM’N RULES § 34.5 (Dec. 2012), available at 
http://www.ethics.state.tx.us/rules/rules12.pdf. 
71. Id. (outlining activities not invoking the registration requirements of Chapter 305). 
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For example, the question of the need to register when communicating 
with state university employees to influence their decisions regarding 
research projects or grants is but one of literally scores of “communications 
triggering registration” hypothetical dilemmas that might present problems 
if presented as a complaint to the Commission or proper prosecutorial 
authority. 
3. Criminal Enforcement Provisions 
Chapter 305 contains language creating a Class A misdemeanor offense 
if that person “intentionally or knowingly violates a provision of this 
chapter.”72  However, it is a third degree felony for a person to retain a 
lobbyist, or for a person to lobby, “for compensation that is totally or 
partially contingent on the passage or defeat of any legislation . . . veto of 
legislation . . . or administrative action.”73  The prohibition on 
contingent-fee lobbying has made its way into several local lobby 
ordinances, albeit in different forms, with some localities prohibiting the 
practice74 while others simply require its disclosure.75 
Title 8 of the Texas Penal Code, entitled “Offenses Against Public 
Administration,” contains eight offenses under the heading “Bribery and 
Corrupt Influence.”76  Any attorney interacting with public servants at the 
state or local level should be aware of Title 8, or risk inadvertently violating 
its provisions.  Practitioners who provide any type of benefit to public 
officials or employees should be cognizant of the gift restrictions, and 
relevant exceptions, found in Chapter 36.77  To avail oneself of the 
exceptions to the gift statute, an advocate must be familiar with the 
definitions, prohibitions, and exceptions in the Code, and be able to 
reconcile those with any applicable local regulations.78 
The Texas Penal Code creates two separate offenses related to gifts, or 
“benefits” in statutory language.  First, it is a crime to solicit or receive a 
gift, and second, it is a separate offense to offer or give a gift.79  
 
72. GOV’T § 305.031(a) (West Supp. 2012). 
73. Id. §§ 305.022(a), 305.031(b) (West 2005 & West Supp. 2012). 
74. See, e.g., AUSTIN, TEX., CITY CODE tit. 4, ch. 4­8, § 4­8­8(C) (2012) (prohibiting persons 
engaged in lobbying from receiving compensation on a contingent fee basis). 
75. See, e.g., DALL., TEX., CITY CODE ch. 12A, art. III­A, § 12A­15.5(c)(4) (2012) (allowing 
lobbyists to receive compensation on a contingent fee basis but requiring its disclosure). 
76. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 8, ch. 36 (West 2011 & Supp. 2012). 
77. See id. §§ 36.08–.10 (outlining the restrictions and exceptions to providing gifts to public 
servants). 
78. See id. tit. 8, ch. 36 (defining terms applicable to gift statute, promulgating prohibitions on 
providing gifts to public servants, and listing exceptions to prohibited conduct). 
79. See id. §§ 36.08–.09 (West 2011) (bifurcating offenses relating to gifts to public servants 
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Significantly, gift prohibitions do not prescribe a culpable mental state.80  
Therefore, the required mental state must be ascertained from Penal Code 
section 6.02, which deems proof of recklessness sufficient for sustaining a 
conviction.81 
Section 36.10 of the Penal Code sets out exceptions to the gift laws.82  
The statute further states that sections 36.08 and 38.09 “[do] not apply to 
food, lodging, transportation, or entertainment accepted as a guest and, if 
the donee [and donor] is required by law to report those items, reported by 
the donee [and donor] in accordance with that law.”83  To take advantage 
of this exception, both the donor and donee must meet relevant reporting 
requirements.84 
There are numerous state statutes requiring (1) the reporting of gifts;85 
(2) that certain public officials file personal financial statements;86 and (3) 
adherence to the conflict of interest provisions for public officials and 
vendors.87  However, the adoption of each municipal ethics ordinance 
brings a new legal reporting requirement.  Therefore, in the event an 
attorney provides food, lodging, transportation, or entertainment to a 
public official, before that lawyer can rely on the defense provided by 
section 36.10(c), those expenses must be reported in accordance with the 
reporting requirements established by the municipal’s lobby ordinance.  
Otherwise, both the lawyer and the local official face Class A misdemeanor 
charges. 
Title 8 of the Penal Code creates another offense that is equally punitive 
but disturbingly vague.  The crime of improper influence harkens back to 
the original prohibition on lobbying, by making it an offense for a person 
to privately address a “public servant who exercises or will exercise official 
 
into one that penalizes receiving a gift and another that penalizes giving a gift). 
80. Hubbard v. State, 668 S.W.2d 419, 421 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1984), rev’d on other grounds, 
739 S.W.2d 341 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (en banc); see PENAL §§ 36.08–.09 (failing to establish a 
requisite mental state for the offenses). 
81. PENAL § 6.02 (West 2011); Hubbard, 668 S.W.2d at 421. 
82. PENAL § 36.10 (West Supp. 2012). 
83. Id. § 36.10(b), (c). 
84. See id. § 36.10(b) (controlling donee reporting); id. § 36.10(c) (governing donor 
reporting). 
85. E.g., TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 305.006(b) (West Supp. 2012) (itemizing what categories 
of gifts must be reported) 
86. See id. § 572.021 (West 2012) (requiring certain state officials to file a personal financial 
statement); TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. §§ 145.001, 145.003 (West 2008) (obligating municipal 
officials for cities with a population over 100,000 to file personal financial statements); id. 
§§ 159.001, 159.003 (West 2008 & West Supp. 2012) (mandating county officials for cities with a 
population over 100,000 must file personal financial statements). 
87. See generally LOC. GOV’T ch. 171 & 176 (West 2008 & Supp. 2012). 
FISCHER_FINAL 6/3/2013  10:54 AM 
48 ST. MARY’S JOURNAL ON LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS [Vol. 3:32 
discretion in an adjudicatory proceeding with [the] intent to influence the 
outcome of the proceeding on the basis of considerations other than those 
authorized by law.”88  Neither the statute nor case law provides much 
guidance as to what is meant by “considerations other than those 
authorized by law.”89 
In City of Stephenville v. Texas Parks & Wildlife Department,90 the court 
found evidence of influence that was both blatant and effective.91  While 
both were embroiled in a contested case pending before a state 
commission, a lawyer met privately with a state commissioner and offered 
to help get the commissioner re-appointed by the governor.92  Judging 
from the facts recounted in the court’s opinion, the influence was quite 
effective: the commissioner changed his vote, reversing the commission’s 
prior action.93  Should an attorney interacting with local officials be 
concerned about the offense of improper influence or the manner in which 
it may intersect with a local lobby ordinance?  Would communication with 
a local official in violation of a local lobby ordinance constitute an attempt 
to “influence the outcome of the proceeding on the basis of considerations 
other than those authorized by law”?94  Would compliance with a local 
lobby ordinance validate an otherwise questionable private entreaty?  These 
are all issues for the cautious lawyer to take into consideration. 
Both the bribery statute95 and the gift statutes96 recognize the role of 
lobby activities, expressly exempting transactions made in accordance with 
the Lobby Law.97  The bribery statute provides that a benefit offered, 
conferred, solicited, or accepted is permissible if made and reported in 
accordance with Chapter 305 of the Government Code.98  It remains an 
offense if the benefit is offered, conferred, solicited, or accepted “pursuant 
 
88. PENAL § 36.04(a) (West 2011) (emphasis added).  An “adjudicatory proceeding” includes 
“any proceeding before a court or any other agency of government in which the legal rights, powers, 
duties, or privileges of specified parties are determined.”  Id. § 36.04(b). 
89. Id. § 36.04(a). 
90. City of Stephenville v. Tex. Parks & Wildlife Dep’t, 940 S.W.2d 667 (Tex. App.—Austin 
1996, writ denied). 
91. Id. at 671. 
92. Id. at 672. 
93. Id. at 673. 
94. PENAL § 36.04(a). 
95. Id. § 36.02 (West 2011). 
96. Id. §§ 36.08–.09. 
97. See id. § 36.02(d) (excepting “expenditure[s] made and reported in accordance with 
Chapter 305, Government Code” from the bribery penalty); id. § 36.10(a)(5) (West Supp. 2012) 
(exempting “a gift, award, or memento to a member of the legislative or executive branch that is 
required to be reported under Chapter 305, Government Code”). 
98. Id. § 36.02(d) (West 2011). 
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to an express agreement to take or withhold [an act] of official discretion”; 
however, prosecution of such an offense requires direct evidence of an 
express agreement.99  The exceptions to the general prohibition on the 
giving and receiving of gifts also incorporate the Lobby Law by exempting 
any “gift, award, or memento to a member of the legislative or executive 
branch that is required to be reported under Chapter 305.”100 
During the previous century, the state law relating to lobbying has 
moved from outright prohibition to a well-regulated system with an 
emphasis on disclosure.  Even the Penal Code has been modified to 
account for the Lobby Law.101  This incremental movement toward 
disclosure continues in Texas through the present day; municipalities have 
implemented the tenets of a regulated and transparent system at the local 
level in an attempt to address issues of influence peddling.102  As discussed 
immediately below, the evolution of state-level lobby restrictions is readily 
apparent in local jurisdictions’ attempts to monitor and regulate the 
practice of lobbying. 
4. The Advent of Lobby Ordinances in Major Texas Cities 
There are inherent legal limitations that account for lobby regulations 
among municipalities as opposed to other local political subdivisions.  
Cities, especially home rule municipalities, have broad ordinance-making 
authority.103  Such municipalities have the implied authority to regulate 
 
99. Id. § 36.02(a)(4) (“[N]ot withstanding any rule of evidence or jury instruction allowing 
factual inferences in the absence of certain evidence, direct evidence of the express agreement shall be 
required in any prosecution under this subdivision.”). 
100. Id. § 36.10(a)(5) (West Supp. 2012). 
101. Compare Act to Define and Punish Lobbying, 30th Leg., R.S., ch. 79, 1907 Tex. Gen. 
Laws 162, 162–63 (prohibiting any form of lobbying regardless of value gift or level of inducement 
and providing no exceptions to the prohibition) (repealed 1957), with PENAL ch. 36 (West 2011 & 
Supp. 2012) (condemning the exercise of undue influence and requiring the disclosure of gifts, but 
providing exceptions to lobbying offenses). 
102. See AUSTIN, TEX., CITY CODE ch. 4-8 (2012) (requiring the registration of all lobbyists 
and the disclosure of all municipal issues on which the person has lobbied); DALL., TEX., CITY CODE 
ch. 12A, art. III­A, § 12A­15.5 (2012) (necessitating the registration of all lobbyists and mandating 
the disclosure of all issues for which the person has lobbied); EL PASO, TEX., MUN. CODE tit. 2, ch. 
2.94, §§ 2.94.040, 2.94.060 (2012) (governing the registration of lobbyists and disclosure of all 
municipal questions for which the person has lobbied); HOUS., TEX., CITY CODE ch. 18, art. V, 
§§ 18­72, 18­74 (2012) (mandating the registration of lobbyists and the disclosure of subjects on 
which influence was expended); SAN ANTONIO, TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 2, art. III, div. 2, 
§ 2­45 (2012) (prohibiting the acceptance or solicitation of gifts or benefits to influence official 
conduct). 
103. See TEX. CONST. art. XI, § 5(a) (outlining the ability of cities to amend their charters and 
levy taxes); TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. §§ 51.071, 51.072(a) (West. 2008) (declaring that home-
rule municipalities have full local self-government powers). 
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professions and interactions with city officials.104  Just as importantly as 
the right to regulate, cities have the ability to criminally enforce violations 
of their ordinances.105  Pursuant to state statute, ordinance violations are 
fine-only offenses, with punishment generally capped at $500 per 
offense.106  However, cities may also impose other noncriminal sanctions 
against violators, such as prohibiting culpable parties from contracting 
with the city.107  On the other hand, counties rely on express authority 
delegated by the legislature.108  Consequently, counties have taken varying 
approaches to the regulation of lobbying at the county level.  As a result of 
developing local rules, people who have become accustomed to interacting 
with local officials—people like lawyers, engineers, surveyors, contractors, 
salesmen, and vendors—may find themselves held to new regulatory 
standards when engaging in their normal course of business.  They may 
also find themselves lawfully limited in their ability to interact with any 
public servant because of the application of various Penal Code provisions.  
Therefore, it is increasingly important to be aware of local rules and the 
limitations placed on officers, employees, contractors, vendors, and the 
like. 
Of course, as with all local rules, standards and processes vary from 
entity to entity.  Each entity that has adopted a regulatory mechanism for 
local lobbyists has devised its own threshold for lobby registration, its own 
reporting requirements, and its own limitations on lobby activities.  It is 
not enough, however, to know the regulations affecting the local lobbyist; 
those seeking to influence local government must also know the local 
regulations governing the conduct of the public officials and employees 
whose favor is sought, as well as the criminal laws that impact all public 
servants. 
To date, municipal lobby ordinances have been adopted primarily by 
major metropolitan municipalities in Texas.  This Article will focus on the 
lobby policies adopted by the cities of Austin, Dallas, El Paso, Houston, 
 
104. See LOC. GOV’T § 51.072(a) (granting immense power to home-rule cities to govern all 
matters “incident to local self-government”); City of Beaumont v. Bond, 546 S.W.2d 407, 411 (Tex. 
Civ. App.—Beaumont 1977, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (“The legislative power granted to [home-rule] cities 
. . . is analogous to such power granted to the legislature.”). 
105. LOC. GOV’T § 54.001(a) (West 2008) (providing the power to enforce rules and provide 
punishment for violations). 
106. Id. § 54.001(b) (mandating a $500 cap for fines or penalties, but allowing fines up to 
$2,000 for certain offenses, such as dumping of refuse). 
107. Cf. id. § 54.004 (granting municipalities the broad power for the preservation of the 
municipality and those living there). 
108. City of Laredo v. Webb Cnty., 220 S.W.3d 571, 576 (Tex. App.—Austin 2007, no pet.) 
(citing City of San Antonio v. City of Boerne, 111 S.W.3d 22, 28 (Tex. 2003)). 
FISCHER_FINAL 6/3/2013  10:54 AM 
2013] The Advent of State and Local Lobby Regulations 51 
and San Antonio.  Most adopt the primary structure found in the state 
Lobby Law.  Obvious similarities will become apparent among certain 
cities; for instance, the ordinances of San Antonio and Dallas are virtual 
duplicates of one another,109 while Austin and El Paso reflect each other 
in detailed specificity.110  The common elements of lobby regulations are 
to be expected; however, it is the superficially minor differences among 
jurisdictions that pose potential issues for legal practitioners.  This Article 
identifies the common elements as well as the small meaningful 
distinctions, and aims to explain the significance of each. 
The development of local lobby policies has not been uniform, and each 
municipality covered in this Article has its own unique history that has 
informed the development of its regulatory framework.  Dallas, for 
instance, overhauled its existing Code of Conduct for city officers and 
former officers in 2001.111  However, a bribery scandal involving builders 
of low-income housing that funneled bribes to a councilman presaged the 
adoption of a lobby registration ordinance in late 2009.112 
Houston city officials also faced charges and convictions for official 
misconduct, including federal bribery charges.  In 2005, the mayor’s chief 
of staff accepted cash in exchange for offering a vendor inside information 
on airport and parking meter contracts; the city’s building services director 
also accepted bribes, including a trip to the Super Bowl, from a vendor 
competing for an energy contract.113  In 2011, facing criticism that 
attorneys received an unfair advantage under the lobby ordinance, 
Houston’s City Council adopted changes specifically targeted at lawyers 
 
109. Compare SAN ANTONIO, TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 2, art. III, div. V, § 2­65 
(2012) (outlining the registration requirements for lobbyists in San Antonio, with very similar 
language as the Dallas code), with DALL., TEX., CITY CODE ch. 12A, art. III­A, § 12A­15.5 (2012) 
(identifying the requirements and procedures for lobbyist registration under the Dallas City Code, 
using language similar to the San Antonio code). 
110. Compare AUSTIN, TEX., CITY CODE tit. 4, ch. 4-8, § 4-8-4 (2012) , with EL PASO, TEX., 
MUN. CODE tit. 2, ch. 2.94, § 2.94.040 (2012) (requiring lobbyists in El Paso to register under 
conditions very similar to the Austin code). 
111. See Preface, CITY OF DALLAS CODE OF ETHICS (2000), available at 
http://www.dallascityhall.com/pdf/Ethics/CodeOfEthics.pdf (declaring the old code of conduct 
repealed and the new code of ethics to be in place effective January 1, 2001). 
112. Dana Enfinger, Housing Scandal Rocks Dallas, HOUSINGFINANCE.COM (Mar. 1, 2008), 
http://www.housingfinance.com/affordable-housing/housing-scandal-rocks-dallas.aspx (explaining 
the details of the scandal); see DALL., TEX., ORDINANCE 27748 (Nov. 9, 2009) (indicating the 
addition of a lobby registration section to the Dallas Code of Ethics in November of 2009). 
113. David Feldstein, Man Who Bribed 2 Officials in Houston Gets 15 Years, HOUS. CHRON. 
(Nov. 17, 2005), http://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/article/Man-who-bribed-2-officials-in-
Houston-gets-15-1574923.php. 
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advocating on municipal issues.114  The changes generally tracked the 
state Lobby Law and now require all persons lobbying, including 
attorneys, to register.115  In 2012, there were approximately sixty-seven 
registered lobbyists representing close to ninety clients.116 
The City of San Antonio has one of the oldest and most comprehensive 
lobby ordinances, originally adopted in November of 1998.117  The 
ordinance was revised in 2004 as the result of a thorough review by the 
mayor’s integrity unit and a city ethics panel the previous year.118  Due in 
part to its age, and in part to the comprehensive nature of its restrictions, 
the San Antonio Ethics Panel has developed a significant library of ethics 
advisory opinions designed to provide interpretive guidance for ordinance 
compliance.119  About thirty individuals or entities currently register as 
lobbyists with the City of San Antonio.120 
The City of Austin has also adopted a comprehensive lobby 
ordinance,121 and the city currently lists over fifty registrants.122  The 
City of El Paso, which adopted a lobby ordinance in 2006,123 
incorporates many components of Austin’s policy and currently reflects 
 
114. See Bradley Olsen, Houston City Leaders Look to Tighten Ethics, Lobbying Rules, HOUS. 
CHRON. (Jan. 5, 2011), http://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/article/Houston-city-leaders-
look-to-tighten-ethics-1609644.php (discussing the proposal before the City Council to close the 
loophole allowing lawyers to advocate for municipal issues without registering as lobbyists). 
115. See HOUS., TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 18, art. V, § 18-72 (2012) (declaring who 
must register as a lobbyist under the municipal code); see also id. § 18-71 (codifying a broadly 
inclusive definition of person). 
116. See List of Lobbyists, OFFICE OF THE CITY SECRETARY (Jan. 10, 2013), 
http://www.houstontx.gov/citysec/lobbyists/Jan2013.xls (listing the sixty-seven registered lobbyists in 
Houston representing eighty-five different clients). 
117. See CITY OF SAN ANTONIO, LOBBYIST HANDBOOK 1 (2010), available at 
http://www.sanantonio.gov/clerk/ethics/LobbyistHandbook2010.pdf (declaring the City of San 
Antonio established its lobbyist regulations in 1998). 
118. See SAN ANTONIO, TEX., ORDINANCE 98709 (Jan. 15, 2004), available at 
https://webapps1.sanantonio.gov/archivedagendas/CC02011/4v$v01!.pdf (amending the San 
Antonio Ethics Code to include new provisions regarding lobbyist fees). 
119. See Ethics Review Board Opinions, CITY OF SAN ANTONIO, http://www.sanantonio.gov/ 
atty/ethics/formal.htm (last visited May 9, 2013) (demonstrating the volume of opinions generated 
since the inception of the Ethics Review Board). 
120. See City of San Antonio Lobbyists’ Clients, CITY OF SAN ANTONIO (Nov. 26, 2012, 11:19 
AM), http://sanantonio.gov/clerk/ethics/lobbyists.pdf (listing all the registered lobbyists and their 
clients in San Antonio, with twenty-four lobbyists registered). 
121. AUSTIN, TEX., CITY CODE tit. 4, ch. 4-8 (2012). 
122. View Lobbyist, CITY OF AUSTIN, http://www.ci.austin.tx.us/cityclerk/lobbyist/list_ 
lobbyists.cfm (last visited May 9, 2013). 
123. See EL PASO, TEX., ORDINANCE 16300 (Mar. 7, 2006) (approving the addition of a 
section of municipal code regulating the activities of lobbyists). 
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twenty-six registered lobbyists.124 
III.     COMMON ELEMENTS OF LOBBY REGULATION SYSTEMS 
In crafting local lobby ordinances, large Texas municipalities have relied 
on state law for guidance.  The more sophisticated regulations include 
common elements such as: definitions of communication, compensation 
and expenditure thresholds, parameters for the matter being advocated for 
or against, and disclosure requirements.125  However, each of these 
elements may differ in slight, but significant, ways from locality to locality.  
Moreover, each lobby ordinance treats attorneys differently and imposes 
different limitations and obligations on local lobbying by lawyers.  Rather 
than present a detailed analysis of the various local lobby ordinances 
(which are frequently changed or updated), this Article highlights common 
elements, recognizes some meaningful distinctions, and illuminates the 
impact on legal advocacy at the local level. 
A. Compensation and Expenditures 
Local lobbyist limitations were clearly inspired by the state Lobby Law 
definition of compensation as “money, service, facility, or other thing of 
value or financial benefit that is received or is to be received in return for 
or in connection with services rendered or to be rendered.”126  The major 
cities with lobbyist regulations—Austin, Dallas, El Paso, Houston, and 
San Antonio—each define compensation in generally similar language.127  
Even small distinctions among local definitions are worth noting, however, 
as they could have a meaningful impact on determining whether a person 
is required to register as a lobbyist. 
The City of Austin’s basic definition of compensation128 tracks 
Chapter 305 of the Government Code word for word, and that same 
 
124. Registered Lobbyists, CITY OF EL PASO, http://www.elpasotexas.gov/muni_clerk/registered_ 
lobbyist.asp (last visited May 9, 2012). 
125. Cf. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. ch. 305 (West 2005 & Supp. 2012) (providing specific 
parameters for the regulation and registration of lobbyists under state law, upon which many 
municipalities built their local regulations). 
126. Id. § 305.002(3) (West Supp. 2012). 
127. AUSTIN, TEX., CITY CODE tit. 4, ch. 4-8, § 4-8-2(2) (2012) (“money, service, facility[,] 
or other thing of value or financial benefit”); DALL., TEX., CITY CODE ch. 12A, art. III-A, 
§ 12A­15.2(3)(A) (2012) (“money, service, facility, or other thing of value”); EL PASO, TEX., MUN. 
CODE tit. 2, ch. 2.94, § 2.94.020 (2012) (“money or other tangible thing of value”); HOUS., TEX., 
CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 18, art. V, § 18-71 (2012) (“money, service, facility, or other thing of 
value or benefit”); SAN ANTONIO, TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 2, art. III, div. V, § 2-62(c) 
(2012) (“money or any other thing of value”). 
128. AUSTIN, TEX., CITY CODE tit 4, ch. 4-8, § 4-8-2(2) (2012). 
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definition originated in the 1957 Representation Before the Legislature 
Act.129  The City of Houston’s definition of compensation130 also tracks 
the definition in Chapter 305, but with a potentially significant one-word 
distinction: whereas state law refers to a “thing of value or financial 
benefit,” Houston’s ordinance removes the word “financial,” thereby 
broadening the type of benefit that may qualify as compensation and 
trigger registration.131  The City of El Paso offers a shorter—if not 
simpler—definition of compensation as “money or other tangible thing of 
value” that is received in return for lobby services.132 
The ordinances of both Dallas and San Antonio delve into the intent 
and structure behind compensation arrangements by adding a level of 
scrutiny to the relationship between advocate and client.  In defining 
compensation, the Dallas ordinance stipulates that lobbyists engaging in 
lobbying and similar advocacy must include all amounts received “if, for 
the purpose of evading the lobby obligations imposed under this article, 
the lobbyist has structured the receipt of compensation in a way that 
unreasonably minimizes the value of the lobbying activities.”133  The City 
of San Antonio lobby ordinance includes almost identical language.134 
Each of these ordinances, with the exception of Houston’s, excludes 
certain types of payments from the definition of compensation.  These 
exceptions include payments made to a person regardless of whether the 
person was engaged in lobbying activities if those payments are ordinarily 
made.135  They also except any gain from the determination of a 
 
129. See Representation Before the Legislature Act, 55th Leg., 1st C.S., ch. 9, 1957 Tex. Gen. 
Laws 17, 17 (establishing the definition of compensation to be used in future lobbyist statutes) 
(repealed 1973). 
130. HOUS., TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 18, art. V, § 18-71 (2012). 
131. Compare GOV’T § 305.002(3) (“‘Compensation’ means money, service, facility, or other 
thing of value of financial benefit that is received.”), with HOUS., TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 
18, art. V, § 18-71 (2012) (“Compensation means money, service, facility, or other thing of value or 
benefit that is received . . . .”). 
132. EL PASO, TEX., MUN. CODE tit. 2, ch. 2.94, § 2.94.020 (2012). 
133. DALL., TEX., CITY CODE ch. 12A, art. III-A, § 12A-15.2(3)(C) (2012). 
134. See SAN ANTONIO, TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 2, art III, div. V, § 2-62(c) (2012) 
(“If a lobbyist engages in both lobbying activities and other activities on behalf of a person, 
compensation for lobbying includes all amounts received from that person, if, for the purpose of 
evading the obligations imposed under division 5, the lobbyist has structured the receipt of 
compensation in a way that unreasonably minimizes the value of the lobbying activities.”). 
135. See AUSTIN, TEX., CITY CODE tit. 4, ch. 4-8, § 4-8-2 (2012) (stating compensation does 
not include incidental expenses); DALL., TEX., CITY CODE ch. 12A, art. III-A, § 12A-15.2(B) (2012) 
(excluding incidental expense from compensation); EL PASO, TEX., MUN. CODE tit 2, ch 2.94, 
§ 2.94.020 (2012) (stating compensation excludes incidental expenses); SAN ANTONIO, TEX., CODE 
OF ORDINANCES ch. 2, art III, div. V, § 2-62(d) (2012) (limiting expenditures by not including 
incidental expenses). 
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municipal question, unless the value is in the form of a contingent fee.136  
Austin, Dallas, El Paso, and Houston each establish a compensation 
threshold of $200 in a calendar quarter; less than this will not trigger the 
registration requirements.137  In addition to the quarterly threshold, the 
City of Houston requires registration for anyone who has been paid $800 
in a calendar year for lobbying services.138  The City of San Antonio, 
however, has no minimum threshold; compensation or an expenditure of 
any amount will trigger registration requirements for not only persons paid 
for the lobbying services, but also for those paying for lobbying 
services.139 
As with state law, compensation is one of two financial thresholds that 
trigger registration.140  A person is also required to register if he crosses 
the relevant expenditure threshold.141  The local definitions of 
expenditure are relatively uniform and generally reflect the state law 
definition.  Generally, the definitions of expenditure include “a payment, 
distribution, loan, advance, reimbursement, deposit, or gift of money or 
any thing of value, including a contract, promise, or agreement, whether or 
not legally enforceable.”142 
B. City Officials 
Each locality with an established lobby regulation process has adopted 
its own unique class of decision makers with whom communication 
triggers registration.  Again, while there is general consistency, minor 
 
136. See AUSTIN, TEX., CITY CODE ch 4-8, § 4-8-2 (2012) (“Compensation shall not include 
the financial gain that [a] person may realize as a result of the determination of a municipal question, 
unless that gain is in the form of a contingent fee.”); EL PASO, TEX., MUN. CODE tit 2, ch. 2.94 
§ 2.94.020 (2012) (“Compensation shall not include the financial gain that a person may realize as a 
result of the determination of a municipal question, unless that gain is in the form of a contingent 
fee.”); SAN ANTONIO, TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 2, art III, div. V § 2-62(c) (2012) 
(“Compensation does not include the financial gain that a person may realize as a result of the 
determination of a municipal question, unless that gain is in the form of a contingent fee.”). 
137. AUSTIN, TEX., CITY CODE tit. 4, ch. 4-8, § 4-8-4(1) (2012); DALL., TEX., CITY CODE 
ch. 12A, art. III-A, § 12A-15.3(a)(1) (2012); EL PASO, TEX., MUN. CODE tit. 2, ch. 2.94, 
§ 2.94.040(A)(1) (2012); HOUS., TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 18, art. V, § 18-72(a)(1) 
(2012). 
138. HOUS., TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 18, art. V, § 18-72(a)(2) (2012). 
139. See SAN ANTONIO, TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch.2, art. III, div. V, § 2-63 (2012) 
(requiring registration of any person who “engages in lobbying activities for compensation” as well as 
any person who “expends monies for lobbying activities”). 
140. See 1 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 34.43(a) (2012) (Tex. Ethics Comm’n, Compensation and 
Reimbursement Threshold). 
141. See, e.g., AUSTIN, TEX., CITY CODE tit. 4, ch. 4-8, § 4-8-4(3) (2012) (mandating 
registration of a person who “expends $200 or more in a calendar quarter for lobbying”). 
142. HOUS., TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 18, art. V, § 18-71 (2012). 
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differences between municipalities are important to note. 
The City of El Paso offers the simplest and most straightforward class of 
decision makers, defining a city official to include the mayor, any council 
member, the city manager, or members of certain boards, commissions, 
and committees.143 
The City of Austin’s lobby ordinance broadens the definition to include 
staff, expressly naming “the mayor, a councilmember, or a member of the 
City staff” or a designated board, commission, or committee.144  The 
“applicability” section of the ordinance applies to a person who lobbies any 
of the following: “the mayor, a council member, their aides . . . a member 
of a board, [or] task force . . . the city manager, an assistant city manager, 
their aides, the city attorney, an assistant city attorney, [and] a department 
or assistant department director.”145 
The City of Dallas offers a similar definition of city official, including 
the mayor and members of city council, the city manager as well as 
assistant city managers, the city attorney and first assistant city attorney, 
the city secretary and first assistant city secretary, the city auditor and first 
assistant city auditor, municipal judges, all department directors, and a 
litany of board and commission members.146 
The City of San Antonio establishes the broadest definition.  As with 
the other ordinances discussed, it applies to the mayor and members of city 
council and covers “municipal court judges and magistrates, the city 
manager, deputy city manager, city clerk, assistant city clerk, assistant city 
managers, . . . all department heads . . . [and] internal auditor and assistant 
internal auditors.”147  In addition to including a specific list of boards and 
commission members who qualify as city officials, the ordinance includes 
“any other board or commission that is more than advisory in nature.”148  
When compared to other ordinances, however, San Antonio’s definition 
appears to reach down further into the bureaucratic structure, specifically 
 
143. EL PASO, TEX., MUN. CODE tit. 2, ch. 2.94, § 2.94.050 (2012); see also id. § 2.94.030 
(enumerating eight specific boards and commissions whose members are included in the definition of 
city official). 
144. AUSTIN, TEX., CITY CODE tit. 4, ch. 4-8, § 4-8-2(1) (2012). 
145. Id. § 4-8-3. 
146. DALL., TEX., CITY CODE ch. 12A, art. III-A, § 15.2(1)(h)(i) to (xvi) (2012) (including 
members of the board of adjustment, the building inspection board, the plan and zoning 
commission, the civil service board, the community development commission, the rapid transit 
board, the airport board, the ethics advisory commission, the housing finance corporation board, the 
landmark commission, local government corporation boards, municipal management district boards, 
park and recreation board, and all reinvestment zone boards). 
147. SAN ANTONIO, TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 2, art. III, div. V, § 2-62(a) (2012). 
148. Id. 
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including assistant department heads, assistants to city council, and 
assistants to the mayor (including contract personnel), the secretary to the 
city manager, executive secretaries, the community action manager, the 
public utilities supervisor, and members of bid committees.149  Further, 
the definition of city official includes board members of the city’s electric 
and water providers.150 
Rather than define city official, the City of Houston’s lobby ordinance 
actually divides the municipal infrastructure into executive and legislative 
departments.151  The Houston ordinance defines a “member of the 
legislative branch” as “a council-member, council-member elect, or 
candidate for the office of council member.”152  It offers a much broader 
definition of “member of the executive branch,” which reflects the internal 
operation of the city’s municipal government.153  That definition includes 
the mayor (as well as candidates for mayor), the city controller (and 
candidates for that office), an employee of the city, and any member of 
specified boards.154 
C. Communication 
Whereas the state Lobby Law applies only in situations where a person 
has direct communication with a member of the executive or legislative 
branch, local lobby restrictions have expanded definitions in an effort to 
regulate “indirect” communication with local officials.155  Only the City 




151. HOUS., TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 18, art. V, § 18-71 (2012). 
152. Id.  The decision to treat candidates for office the same as actual officeholders is analogous 
to the definition of “public servant” found in the Penal Code, which include candidates for public 
office.  TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07(a)(41) (West Supp. 2012). 
153. HOUS., TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 18, art. V, § 18-71 (2012). 
154. Id.  The specified boards include:  
The Archaeological and Historical Commission, Airport Land Use Regulations Board of 
Adjustment, Automotive Board, Board of Public Trusts, Boiler Code Review and Licensing 
Board, Building and Standards Commission, Civil Service Commission, Electrical Board, Fire 
Board of Appeals, General Appeals Board, Helicopter Facilities Licensing and Appeals Board, 
Mechanical Code Review Board, Municipal Board on Sign Control, Planning Commission, 
Plumbing Code Review Board, Tower Permit Commission, or Wastewater Capacity 
Reservation Review Board. 
 
Id. 
155. See, e.g., AUSTIN, TEX., CITY CODE tit. 4, ch. 4-8, § 4-8-1 (2008) (including indirect 
communication within the definition of lobbying). 
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communication.156  Unlike the state statute, most of the local ordinances 
attempt to define lobbying by incorporating the meaning of 
communication within the various definitions.157 
It should be noted that each local definition incorporates some generally 
accepted exceptions to the definition of lobbying.  Common exceptions 
include communications made by a member of a media organization,158 
by a public official acting within his or her official capacity,159 “a mere 
request for information,”160 a statement made at a meeting conducted in 
accordance with the Texas Open Meetings Act,161 official testimony at a 
hearing or in a formal proceeding,162 or communication made in a 
publicly available speech, article, or publication.163 
The cities of Dallas and San Antonio have adopted nearly identical 
definitions of the conduct that constitutes lobbying, including:  
[A]ny oral or written communication (including an electronic 
communication) to a city official, made directly or indirectly by any person 
in an effort to influence or persuade an official to favor or oppose, 
recommend or not recommend, vote for or against, or take or refrain from 
taking action on any municipal question.164  
The cities of Austin and El Paso share nearly identical definitions of 
lobbying: the direct or indirect “solicitation of a City official, by private 
interview, postal or telephonic communications, or any other means other 
than public expression at a meeting of City officials.”165 
When considering who constitutes a local lobbyist, it is also important 
to note that most of the ordinances—like the state Lobby Law—treat as a 
“registrant” anyone who is required to register as a lobbyist but has not 
done so.166 
 
156. TEX GOV’T CODE ANN. § 305.002(2) (West 2009); HOUS., TEX., CODE OF 
ORDINANCES ch. 18, art V, § 18-71 (2012). 
157. E.g., AUSTIN, TEX., CITY CODE tit. 4, ch. 4-8, § 4-8-1 (2012). 
158. E.g., id. § 4-8-5(1). 
159. E.g., EL PASO, TEX., MUN. CODE tit. 2, ch. 2, § 2.94.050(A) (2012). 
160. AUSTIN, TEX., CITY CODE tit. 4, ch. 4-8, § 4-8-2(6) (2008); accord DALL., TEX., CITY 
CODE ch. 12A, art. III-A, § 12A-15.2(10)(B)(i) (2012) (including a similar exception). 
161. E.g., HOUS., TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 18, art. V, § 18-73(2) (2012). 
162. E.g., id. § 18-73(2). 
163. E.g., DALL., TEX., CITY CODE ch. 12A, art. III-A, § 12A-15.2(10)(b)(i) (2012). 
164. Id. § 12A-15.2(10); see SAN ANTONIO, TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch.2, art III, div. 
V, § 2-62(i) (2012). 
165. AUSTIN, TEX., CITY CODE tit. 4, ch. 4-8, § 4-8-2(6) (2012); accord EL PASO, TEX., 
MUN. CODE tit. 2, ch. 2.94, § 2.94.020 (2012). 
166. AUSTIN, TEX., CITY CODE tit. 4, ch. 4-8, § 4-8-2(11) (2012); DALL., TEX., CITY CODE 
ch. 12A, art. III-A, § 12A-15.2(14) (2012); EL PASO, TEX., MUN. CODE tit. 2, ch. 2.94, § 2.94.020 
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D. Municipal Question 
The registration requirements will not be triggered if a lobbyist 
communicates with a covered city official on a topic other than a 
municipal question.167  The Texas Ethics Commission’s inclusion of a 
“goodwill communication” has not yet been incorporated into the 
municipal definitions of communication; thus, communications intended 
to “generate or maintain goodwill for the purpose of influencing potential 
future legislation” remain unhindered at the local level.168 
The cities of Dallas, El Paso, and San Antonio have adopted very similar 
yet far-reaching definitions of a municipal question.  Essentially, a 
municipal question is any “public policy issue of a discretionary nature that 
is pending before, or that may be the subject of action by, the city council 
or any city board or commission.”169  The term includes, but is not 
limited to, proposed actions or proposals for action in the form of 
ordinances, resolutions, motions, recommendations, reports, regulations, 
policies, nominations, appointments, sanctions, and bids.170  It includes 
the adoption of “specifications, awards, grants, or contracts”; however, it 
excludes such routine matters as “permitting, platting[,] and design 
approval.”171 
The City of Austin takes a slightly different approach, defining a 
municipal question as a “proposed or proposal for an ordinance, 
resolution, motion, recommendation, report, regulation, policy, 
 
(2012); HOUS., TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 18, art. V, § 18-71 (2012); SAN ANTONIO, TEX., 
CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 2, art III, div. V, § 2-62(m) (2012). 
167. See, e.g., EL PASO, TEX., MUN. CODE tit. 2, ch. 2.94, §§ 2.94.020 (2012) (defining 
municipal question as “a public policy issue of a discretionary nature pending or impending before 
the city council, a legislative review committee of the council, or any board, commission or 
committee set forth in Section 2.94.030 of this chapter, including but not limited to a proposed or 
proposal for an ordinance, resolution, motion, recommendation, report, regulation, policy, 
appointment, sanction, bid, a request for proposal, including the development of specifications, an 
award, grant, or contract, and all matters before the boards, commissions or committees listed in 
Section 2.94.030 (B), C, D, K and L of this chapter”). 
168. Cf. Tex. Ethics Comm’n Op. No. 467, at 1 (2006) (declaring political contributions 
intended to generate goodwill are prohibited); Tex. Ethics Comm’n Op. No. 46, at 1 (1992) 
(“[C]ommunications to generate goodwill may be communications to influence[.]”). 
169. DALL., TEX., CITY CODE ch. 12A, art. III-A, § 12A-15.2(12) (2012); see EL PASO, TEX., 
MUN. CODE tit. 2, ch. 2.94, § 2.94.020 (2012); SAN ANTONIO, TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 
2, art III, div. V, § 2-62(k) (2012). 
170. DALL., TEX., CITY CODE ch. 12A, art. III-A, § 12A-15.2(12) (2012); EL PASO, TEX., 
MUN. CODE tit. 2, ch. 2.94, § 2.94.020 (2012); SAN ANTONIO, TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 
2, art III, div. V, § 2-62(k) (2012). 
171. DALL., TEX., CITY CODE ch. 12A, art. III-A, § 12A-15.2(12) (2012); see EL PASO, TEX., 
MUN. CODE tit. 2, ch. 2.94, § 2.94.020 (2012); SAN ANTONIO, TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 
2, art III, div. V, § 2-62(k) (2012). 
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appointment, sanction, and bid, including the development of 
specifications, an award grant or contact for more than $2,000.”172  
Although seemingly similar, the slight variations may have a substantive 
effect.  First, unlike the ordinances of El Paso and San Antonio, it does not 
expressly include an “impending” matter,173 or in the case of Dallas, a 
matter that “may be the subject of action by” the city.174  Arguably, then, 
the Austin ordinance may be limited to those proposals that are actually 
before the relevant city officials.  Additionally, Austin places a minimum 
threshold of $2,000 on contracts that would raise a municipal question.175 
Again, the City of Houston takes the approach most similar to the state 
Lobby Law, which defines two types of matters—municipal legislation and 
administrative action.176  Administrative action is defined as “rulemaking, 
licensing, or any other matter that may be the subject of action by a city 
official, city department[,] or other city agency, including the proposal, 
consideration, or approval of the matter.”177  The term excludes day-to-
day matters relating to the application or administration of existing city 
programs or policies.178  Municipal legislation, by comparison, is defined 
as “an ordinance, resolution, motion, amendment[,] or other matter 
pending before the city council” or “[a]ny matter that is or may be the 
subject of action by the city council or a council committee, including 
drafting, placing on the agenda, consideration, passage, defeat, approval, or 
countersignature of the matter.”179 
These highly technical distinctions are important because they 
determine whether a lawyer advocating at the local level must register as a 
lobbyist, and therefore subject himself—and his client—to significantly 
more public scrutiny.  Determining whether the subject of representation 
constitutes a municipal question will dictate whether the attorney must 
disclose his client’s identity, the client’s specific goals, the structure of his 
professional engagement, the nature of his interactions with local officials, 
the fundamental basis of his advocacy strategy, and in some instances, his 
 
172. AUSTIN, TEX., CITY CODE tit. 4, ch. 4-8, § 4-8-2(9) (2012). 
173. SAN ANTONIO, TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 2, art III, div. V, § 2-62(k) (2012); EL 
PASO, TEX., MUN. CODE tit. 2, ch. 2.94, § 2.94.020 (2012). 
174. DALL., TEX., CITY CODE ch. 12A, art. III-A, § 12A-15.2(12) (2012). 
175. AUSTIN, TEX., CITY CODE tit. 4, ch. 4-8, § 4-8-2(9) (2012). 
176. Compare HOUS., TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 18, art. V, § 18-71 (2012) (providing 
definitions for both municipal legislation and administrative action), with TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. 
§ 305.002(1) (West Supp. 2012) (defining administrative action), and id. § 305.002(6) (defining 
legislation in the context of lobbying). 
177. HOUS., TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 18, art. V, § 18-71 (2012). 
178. Id. 
179. Id. 
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compensation.180 
E. Reporting 
Each ethics ordinance under discussion has specific disclosure 
requirements for a local lobbyist’s initial registration as well as for ongoing 
activity reports.  For attorneys who find themselves subject to a municipal 
lobby regulation, these disclosures will likely require more detailed 
information than most attorneys are accustomed to providing. 
The ordinances of Austin, San Antonio, and Dallas each require new 
registrants to identify their client and specify the municipal questions they 
seek to influence.181  The ordinances also mandate quarterly disclosure of 
any initial contact with city officials and whether the representation is 
contingent upon the outcome of the municipal question.182  The 
subsequent quarterly activity reports must include the client, the specific 
issues subject to the lobby efforts, a list of city officials contacted, all 
expenditures made in connection with lobby activities, and a list of all the 
registrant’s employees who engaged in lobby activities.183  Additionally, 
each activity report must be sworn to.184  It is worth noting that the 
Dallas and San Antonio ordinances also require lobbyists who 
communicate in writing to include the identity of their client in the 
written communication; if having a conversation with a city official, the 
lobbyist must orally identify her client to the municipal official.185 
The City of Houston requires a lobbyist’s initial registration to include 
the client’s identity, the subject of the lobby activity, and whether the 
lobbyist’s compensation is partially or totally contingent on the outcome 
of the matter.186  Interestingly, Houston does not require the same detail 
mandated by other cities in subsequent activity reports—a lobbyist is not 
 
180. See, e.g., EL PASO, TEX., MUN. CODE tit. 2, ch. 2.94, § 2.94.020 (2012) (defining 
lobbying as action taken on a municipal question, which triggers the registration requirement under 
section 2.94.040). 
181. E.g., DALL., TEX., CITY CODE ch. 12A, art. III-A, § 12A-15.5(c) (2012). 
182. E.g., SAN ANTONIO, TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 2, art III, div. V, § 2-65(e) 
(2012). 
183. AUSTIN, TEX., CITY CODE tit. 4, ch. 4-8, § 4-8-7 (2012); DALL., TEX., CITY CODE ch. 
12A, art. III-A, § 12A-15.6 (2012); SAN ANTONIO, TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 2, art III, div. 
V, § 2-66 (2012). 
184. See DALL., TEX., CITY CODE ch. 12A, art. III-A, § 12A-15.6 (2012) (“Activity Reports”); 
SAN ANTONIO, TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 2, art III, div. V, § 2-66 (2012) (“Quarterly 
Activity Report”). 
185. DALL., TEX., CITY CODE ch. 12A, art. III-A, § 12A-15.9 (2012); SAN ANTONIO, TEX., 
CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 2, art III, div. V, § 2-68 (2012). 
186. HOUS., TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 18, art. V, § 18-74 (2012). 
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required to list the specific contacts with city officials that relate to her 
advocacy, but only needs to list expenditures made in the course of 
lobbying.187 
Only the City of El Paso takes into account the professional restrictions 
imposed upon licensed attorneys:  
  A registrant who is an attorney shall not be required to report under 
[the initial registration section or the activity reports section], specific facts or 
information that would cause the attorney to violate the Texas Disciplinary 
Rules of Professional Conduct; provided however, that the ability to exclude 
certain privileged or confidential information under the his subsection shall 
not constitute nor be interpreted to constitute a complete exception to the 
registration or activity reporting requirement for an attorney who is required 
to register under this chapter.188  
Like the other ordinances analyzed, the El Paso ordinance requires the 
initial registration to identify the client and the specific municipal 
questions at issue.189  Subsequent activity reports must also name the 
client, identify the specific municipal question that was the subject of the 
lobby activities, itemize lobby expenditures and gifts made to public 
officers, and list the city officials that were contacted on behalf of each 
client.190  The question, then, is what information a lawyer–lobbyist may 
withhold from his report.  Furthermore, what reported information can be 
omitted from disclosure under one of the exceptions in the Code?  This 
issue is discussed further below, but it should be noted that there is 
precedent for treating the client’s identity as confidential.191  Further, any 
communication between attorney and client is confidential, and that 
protection extends to both privileged and unprivileged information.192  
Therefore, can the municipal questions of concern to the client be 
withheld from public disclosure? 
 
187. Id. § 18-75. 
188. EL PASO, TEX., MUN. CODE tit. 2, ch. 2.94, § 2.94.060(B) (2012). 
189. Id. § 2.94.060(A)(3). 
190. Id. § 2.94.070. 
191. See TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.05(a), reprinted in TEX. 
GOV’T CODE ANN., tit. 2, subtit. G, app. A (West 2005) (Tex. State Bar R. art. X, § 9); cf. ALA. 
CODE § 36-25-1(20) (LexisNexis Supp. 2012) (attorneys involved in drafting legislation or rendering 
opinions regarding the effects of registration are not considered lobbyists); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 24-6-101 (2012) (lobbying does not include attorney–client communications that involve the 
practice the law); D.C. CODE § 1-1161.01(32)(B) (2012) (representation by an attorney of a client 
before an executive agency hearing is not lobbying); N.Y. LEGIS. LAW § 1-c (Consol. Supp. 2012) 
(participation of an attorney on behalf of a client in a public proceeding is not deemed lobbying). 
192. TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.05(a). 
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F. Contingent Fees and Procurement Issues 
At the state level, the issue of advocating on a contingent fee basis is 
deceptively straightforward.  The Texas Government Code generally 
prohibits lobbying on a contingent fee basis193 and provides that a 
violation of the prohibition constitutes a third degree felony.194  In fact, 
the law creates two offenses: first, it is unlawful for the client to “retain or 
employ another person to influence legislation or administrative action for 
compensation that is totally or partially contingent on the passage or defeat 
of any legislation, the governor’s approval or veto of any legislation, or the 
outcome of any administrative action”;195 and second, it is unlawful for a 
person (regardless of status as a registered lobbyist) to accept such 
employment.196 
However, the statute establishes exceptions to the general prohibition, 
which are largely intended to address the sale of goods to state agencies.  
For example, the statute excludes a sales commission payable to “an 
employee of a vendor of a product or service” so long as the state agency 
purchasing decision does not exceed $10 million.197  Similarly, a quarterly 
or annual compensation performance bonus payable to a vendor’s 
employee is not considered an impermissible contingent fee.198  Note, 
these two exceptions apply specifically to an employee199 of a vendor; 
however, an independent contractor who sells a product or service may 
avoid the contingency fee prohibition only if the purchasing decision does 
not exceed $10 million and the contractor registers as a lobbyist (noting 
the vendor as the lobby client).200  The prohibition does not apply to 
contingency fees “expressly authorized by other law” or for legal 
representation before state administrative agencies in contested hearings or 
in other similarly adversarial proceedings.201  The prohibition and its 
exceptions appear designed to prevent contingent-fee lobbying, while 
simultaneously recognizing traditional compensation for the sale of goods 
and thereby discouraging attempts by consultants to avoid registration by 
masquerading as a salesperson. 
 
193. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 305.022 (West Supp. 2012). 
194. Id. § 305.031(b) (West 2005). 
195. Id. § 305.022(a) (West Supp. 2012). 
196. Id. § 305.022(b). 
197. Id. § 305.022(c)(1). 
198. Id. § 305.022(c)(2). 
199. See id. § 305.022(e) (defining employee as a full-time employee, as opposed to a 
consultant or independent contractor). 
200. Id. § 305.022(c)(1). 
201. Id. § 305.022(d). 
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The issue of contingent-fee lobbying and its connection to the 
procurement process is approached differently by the various Texas cities 
discussed in this Article.  Some cities prohibit contingent-fee lobbying,202 
while others simply mandate that such an arrangement must be 
disclosed.203  Similarly, the cities take varying approaches to the role of 
the lobbyist in procurement matters, though most try to limit advocacy 
while a proposal is out for bid.204  Consequently, a local lobbyist may be 
hired to help secure a municipal contract, but subsequently be barred from 
advocating during the period when the recommendations and decisions are 
made. 
The City of Dallas authorizes the practice of lobbying on a contingent 
fee basis, but requires the arrangement to be reported on registration and 
activity reports.205  The Dallas lobby ordinance also includes, under the 
section entitled “Restricted Activities,” a prohibition against “[l]obbying by 
bidders and proposers on city contracts.”206  The ordinance states:  
A person responding to a request for bids or request for proposals on a city 
contract shall not (either personally or through a representative, employee, or 
agent) lobby a city council member from the time the advertisement or 
public notification of the request for bids or request for proposals is made 
until the time the contract is awarded by the city council.207  
Like Dallas, the City of San Antonio permits lobbying on a contingent 
fee basis, but requires the disclosure of such an arrangement.208  San 
Antonio has an additional provision that requires anyone seeking a 
discretionary contract from the city to disclose certain information, 
including the “identity of any lobbyist, attorney[,] or consultant employed 
for purposes relating to the discretionary contract being sought by any 
individual or entity who would be a party to the discretionary 
contract.”209  After a bid for a contract with the city is released, a person 
acting on a bidder’s behalf is prohibited from contacting city officials or 
 
202. AUSTIN, TEX., CITY CODE tit. 4, ch. 4-8, § 4-8-8(C) (2012). 
203. See DALL., TEX., CITY CODE ch. 12A, art. III-A, § 12A-15.2(12) (2012) (mandating the 
declaration of a contingent fee agreement); SAN ANTONIO, TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 2, art 
III, div. V, § 2-66(e) (2012) (requiring disclosure of a contingent fee arrangement). 
204. E.g., EL PASO, TEX., MUN. CODE tit. 2, ch. 2.94, § 2.94.090(E) (2012) (“During the 
period in which the city has issued a solicitation, including a competitive bid, . . . no person or 
registrant shall engage in any lobbying with city officials or employees.”). 
205. DALL., TEX., CITY CODE ch. 12A, art. III-A, § 12A-15.5(c)(4) & 15.6(a)(3) (2012). 
206. Id. § 12A-15.8(g). 
207. Id. 
208. SAN ANTONIO, TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 2, art. III, div. V, § 2-66(e) (2012). 
209. Id. § 2-59(a)(3). 
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employees (with the exception of the city employees specified in the 
solicitation document) regarding that contract until the item has been 
posted on the city council’s agenda for consideration.210  A violation may 
disqualify the offer from consideration.211 
The City of Houston does not prohibit lobbying on a contingent fee 
basis, but requires a registrant to disclose “[w]hether the registrant’s 
compensation, if any, is totally or partially contingent on the passage or 
defeat of any municipal legislation or the outcome of any administrative 
action.”212 
The City of Austin’s ordinance contains an outright prohibition on 
contingent fees.213  Like the state law, the prohibition applies to both the 
client and the advocate, providing, “No person shall retain or accept 
employment to lobby on a contingent fee basis.”214  However, the 
ordinance does contain an exception for situations where “a contingent fee 
is a standard and customary method of payment for the employment of 
the person.”215  Though not part of its lobby ordinance, the City of 
Austin also establishes an “anti-lobbying” policy relating to the city’s 
procurement procedures.216  The ordinance provides that from the time a 
solicitation is issued until a contract for that project is executed, a bidder or 
the bidder’s agent—including a local lobbyist—may not contact any city 
official, other than the official designated in the solicitation documents, 
about the matter.217  Although the ordinance expressly waives any 
criminal penalty for a violation, there are still potentially serious 
consequences for the bidder or vendor, including disqualification from the 
solicitation and any similar subsequent solicitations.  A vendor who is 
found to have violated the no-contact provision twice during a five-year 
period will, after notice and a hearing, be barred from all city solicitations 
for a period of up to three years.218  If it is determined that the contractor 
violated the no-contact provision after the execution of a contract, the 
contract is voidable at the discretion of the city.  So, not only must a local 
lobbyist report all contacts with city officials during the course of her lobby 
activity, but that person must also be scrupulous enough to know when 
 
210. Id. § 2-61. 
211. Id. 
212. HOUS., TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 18, art. V, § 18-74(a)(5) (2012). 
213. AUSTIN, TEX., CITY CODE tit. 4, ch. 4-8, § 4-8-8(c) (2012). 
214. Id. (emphasis added). 
215. Id. 
216. See id. tit. 2, ch. 2-7, §§ 2-7-101 to 110. 
217. Id. 
218. EL PASO, TEX., MUN. CODE tit. 2, ch. 2.94, § 2.94.130 (2012). 
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those contacts are prohibited by the procurement process, lest the client be 
disqualified and barred from business with the city. 
The City of El Paso does not prohibit lobbying on a contingent fee 
basis, and expressly includes such an arrangement as a trigger for 
registration.219  El Paso’s lobby ordinance also addresses the issue of 
contact during a procurement period.  During the period between the 
issuance of a solicitation and the official notice of the contract award, “no 
person or registrant shall engage in any lobbying activities with city 
officials and employees.”220  Any person or entity found to violate this 
provision may be disqualified by the city council from entering into any 
contract with the city for up to three years.221 
G. Treatment of Attorneys 
The cities discussed herein take differing approaches to attorneys acting 
as lobbyists; the recurring theme, however, is to treat lawyers as any other 
paid advocate and to carve as narrow an exception as possible.222  Most 
ordinances attempt to establish a distinction between lobby work and legal 
work.223  That is, any distinctions between lawyers and nonlawyers are 
based on conduct rather than professional status.  As discussed later, 
however, making a theoretical distinction practicably workable will likely 
prove difficult. 
The cities of Dallas and San Antonio built in limited exceptions to the 
definition of lobbyist that expressly mention licensed lawyers.224  Dallas 
lists among its exceptions to registration: “An attorney or other person 
whose contact with a city official is made solely as part of resolving a 
dispute with the city, provided that the contact is solely with city officials 
who do not vote on or have final authority over any municipal question 
involved.”225  The City of San Antonio takes a similar approach, but it 
references the relevant ethics rule governing attorney communications and 
exempts:  
 
219. Id. § 2.94.040(A)(6). 
220. Id. § 2.94.090(E). 
221. Id. § 2.94.130. 
222. Compare DALL., TEX., CITY CODE ch. 12A, art III-A, § 12A-15.4(5) (2012) (mentioning 
an attorney exception), with AUSTIN, TEX., CITY CODE tit. 4, ch. 4-8, § 4-8-5(7) (2012) (neglecting 
to specifically mention attorneys in the exception). 
223. See, e.g., EL PASO, TEX., MUN. CODE tit. 2, ch. 2.94, § 2.94.050(F) (2012) (recognizing 
exception for attorneys doing legal work). 
224. DALL., TEX., CITY CODE ch. 12A, art. III-A, § 12A-15.4(5) (2012); SAN ANTONIO, 
TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 2, art. III, div. V, § 2-64(5) (2012). 
225. DALL., TEX., CITY CODE ch. 12A, art. III-A, § 12A-15.4(5) (2012). 
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An attorney or other person whose contact with a city official is made solely 
as part of resolving a dispute with the city, provided that the contact is solely 
with city officials who do not vote on or have final authority over any 
municipal question involved and so long as such an attorney complies with Rule 
4.02 of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct, as amended.226  
As will be discussed later, compliance with Rule 4.02 is a significant issue 
for a lawyer–lobbyist to overcome, and one that potentially puts a lawyer 
at a strategic disadvantage. 
The City of Austin, though making no mention of attorneys, also 
incorporates a dispute resolution exception, providing that “a person” 
whose sole contact is made for the purpose of resolving a dispute with the 
city need not register as a lobbyist.227 
The City of El Paso incorporates a slightly modified exception aimed 
specifically at attorneys that relieves the registration requirement:  
  A person who is performing an act that may be performed only by a 
licensed attorney or a person whose contact with a city official is made solely 
as part of the process of resolution of a dispute or other matter that is 
primarily legal in nature between a person and the city if the person is an 
attorney, so long as he complies with Rule 4.02 of the Texas Disciplinary 
Rules of Professional Conduct, as amended.228  
The Houston City Council’s relatively recent changes to its lobby 
ordinance provide an interesting look at how the treatment of attorneys 
can be central to the policymaking process.  Changes adopted by the 
Houston City Council in 2011 were designed specifically to make sure 
attorneys were clearly within the scope of the lobby ordinance and its 
disclosure requirements.229  Consider this question posed by the Houston 
Chronicle’s editorial board: “When is a lobbyist not a lobbyist at Houston 
City Hall?  Answer: When he or she is a lawyer influencing elected officials 
under the guise of performing legal work.”230  At the time, Houston 
Mayor Annise Parker stated, “For whatever reason, lawyers did not want to 
register as lobbyists even though they were doing exactly the same work.  I 
 
226. SAN ANTONIO, TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 2, art. III, div. V, § 2-64(5) (2012) 
(emphasis added). 
227. AUSTIN, TEX., CITY CODE tit. 4, ch. 4-8, § 4-8-5(7) (2012). 
228. EL PASO, TEX., MUN. CODE tit. 2, ch. 2.94, § 2.94.050(F) (2012) (emphasis added). 
229. See Editorial, Lobby Law: City Ordinance Aims to Unmask Attorneys Working to Influence 
Councilmembers, HOUS. CHRON. (Jan. 8, 2011), http://www.chron.com/opinion/editorials/article/ 
Lobby-law-City-ordinance-aims-to-unmask-1692660.php (citing Houston council members stating 
an intention to include attorneys within scope of lobby ordinance). 
230. Id. 
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see no distinction, and if you’re lobbying, you’re lobbying.”231  Attorneys 
representing companies or individuals discussed matters with council 
members, though the attorneys rarely registered as lobbyists, defended 
themselves by explaining they were acting “on behalf of a legal client.”232 
Consequently, the lobby ordinance was amended and now provides 
limited exceptions similar to other cities’ municipal lobby ordinances.  The 
ordinance provides that a person who is otherwise required to register who 
communicates directly with a member of the executive branch is not 
required to register if “performing an act that may be performed only by a 
licensed attorney.”233 
H. Counties 
It is worth noting that two large Texas counties, Harris County and El 
Paso County, have ventured into the area of lobby regulations.  The likely 
explanation for the dearth of counties considering such rules is the lack of 
statutory authority.  It is well settled that Texas counties are limited to the 
power expressly conferred on them by the Texas Legislature.234  To date, 
the legislature has not granted counties blanket authority to regulate the 
practice of lobbying at the local level. 
The two counties, at opposite ends of the state, have taken drastically 
different approaches to the regulation of local lobbying.  In 2009, Harris 
County adopted a policy for the voluntary registration of local lobbyists 
seeking to influence county business:  
 Although the State of Texas, the City of Houston, and other Texas 
jurisdictions require registration and disclosure of lobbying activities, Harris 
County [cannot] do so without enabling legislation.  The county can, 
however, seek voluntary annual registration and financial disclosure showing 
clients represented and specific lobbying topics from any person or entity 
that expends or receives compensation of $200 or more for lobbying 
activities.235  
Currently, only eight individuals representing seven clients have 
 
231. Id. 
232. Bradley Olson, Houston City Leaders Look to Tighten Ethics, Lobbying Rules, HOUS. 
CHRON. (Jan. 5, 2011), http://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/article/Houston-city-leaders-
look-to-tighten-ethics-1609644.php. 
233. HOUS., TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 18, art. V, § 18–72(b)(1) (2012). 
234. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE ATT’Y GEN. OF TEX., 2009 COUNTIES AND DUTIES 
HANDBOOK (2009), available at https://www.oag.state.tx.us/AG_Publications/pdfs/copowers 
duties.pdf (recognizing the legislature has the power to modify the powers of Texas counties). 
235. HARRIS CNTY. ETHICS POLICY 3 (2009), available at http://www.harriscountytx.gov/ 
CmpDocuments/63/Doc/Ethics%20Policy.pdf. 
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voluntarily registered as Harris County lobbyists.236 
El Paso County, recognizing the lack of statutory authority, sought and 
received its own enabling legislation for a code of ethics,237 including its 
own ethics commission and lobby regulations.  The resulting regulatory 
framework is generally comparable to the municipal ordinances covered 
herein.  El Paso County has adopted an expansive definition of “county 
public servant” that includes all elected county officials, candidates for 
county office, the county auditor, the county purchasing agent, all county 
employees, all assistant district attorneys, and appointed members of 
county and multi-jurisdictional boards.238  The Code of Ethics adopts a 
standard definition of lobbyist that excludes “[a]n attorney who 
communicates directly with a county public servant to the extent that such 
communication relates to the attorney’s representation of a party in a civil 
or criminal proceeding.”239  The enabling statute provides the definition 
of lobbyist, but authorizes the county ethics commission to adopt the 
appropriate compensation threshold, directing the commission to look to 
the rules of the Texas Ethics Commission, adopted pursuant to the state 
Lobby Law, for guidance.240 
Interestingly, the only criminal offenses created by El Paso County’s 
enabling legislation relate to the breach of the commission’s sworn 
complaint process.241  Unauthorized destruction or removal of 
confidential information may result in a fine between $25 and $4,000, as 
 
236. See Stan Stanart, Summary of Registered Lobbyists in Harris County, HARRIS COUNTY 
CLERK’S OFFICE: ETHICS SYSTEM, http://www.ethics.cclerk.hctx.net/LobbyistRegistartion/ 
LobbyBrowse.aspx (last visited Mar. 25, 2013) (providing a current list of all voluntarily registered 
lobbyists in Harris County). 
237. TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 161.101 (West Supp. 2012) (“The commission shall 
enforce the provisions of the ethics code by issuing appropriate orders or recommendations or by 
imposing appropriate penalties.”).  See generally EL PASO CNTY., TEX., CODE OF ETHICS § 4 (2012), 
available at http://www.epcounty.com/ethicscom/documents/Code_of_Ethics.pdf (creating a 
detailed code of ethics regarding the procedures and regulations for lobbyists). 
238. See EL PASO CNTY., TEX., CODE OF ETHICS § 2.2 (2012), available at 
http://www.epcounty.com/ethicscom/documents/Code_of_Ethics.pdf (listing explicit definitions for 
county public servant, county officer, and county employee). 
239. See id. § 2.8 (“Lobbyist means a person who, receives, or is entitled to receive under an 
agreement under which the person is retained or employed . . . .”). 
240. See LOC. GOV’T § 161.101 (citing the general powers of the county ethics commission). 
241. See id. § 161.173(d)–(h) (West Supp. 2012) (“A person who obtains access to confidential 
information under this chapter commits an offense if that person knowingly: (1) uses the confidential 
information for the purpose other than the purpose for which the information was received or for a 
purpose unrelated to this chapter, including solicitation of political contributions or solicitation of 
clients; (2) permits inspection of the confidential information by a person who is not authorized to 
inspect the information; or (3) discloses the confidential information to a person who is not 
authorized to receive the information.”). 
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well as confinement anywhere from three days to three months.242  
Unauthorized disclosure, distribution, or use of confidential information 
subject to the sworn complaint process is punishable by a fine up to 
$1,000 and confinement in the county jail for up to six months.243  Such 
a breach constitutes official misconduct, subjects an employee to discipline 
or termination, and justifies referral to the district attorney for behavior 
constituting a violation of the Penal Code.244 
In considering an actual violation of the Code of Ethics, the El Paso 
Ethics Commission may issue “a cease and desist order,” which is “an 
affirmative order to require compliance with the law[],” and “an order of 
public censure with or without a civil penalty.”245  The civil penalty may 
be up to $4,000 for violating the Code of Ethics, or up to $500 for delayed 
compliance with a commission order.246 
In contrast to municipal lobby ordinances, which create a Class C 
misdemeanor for violating their terms, the legislation enabling El Paso 
County’s regulatory process does not create a crime for violating its 
standards; it criminalizes the release of information relating to an 
investigation of those violations.247  In other words, a private attorney 
who fails to properly register or report as a lobbyist may face a reprimand 
or civil penalty, but the public attorney conducting the investigation of 
such behavior faces imprisonment for improperly disclosing information 
about the investigation. 
 
242. See id. § 161.173(e) (explicating the confidentiality requirements associated with the 
commission and the commission staff); EL PASO CNTY., TEX., CODE OF ETHICS § 17.3 (2012), 
available at http://www.epcounty.com/ethicscom/documents/Code_of_Ethics.pdf (“A person 
commits an offense if the person intentionally: destroys, mutilates, or alters information obtained 
under this chapter; or removes information obtained under this chapter without permission as 
provided by this chapter.”). 
243. LOC. GOV’T § 161.173(h) (West Supp. 2012). 
244. See  EL PASO CNTY., TEX., CODE OF ETHICS §§ 17.3.2, 17.3.3 (2012), available at 
http://www.epcounty.com/ethicscom/documents/Code_of_Ethics.pdf (“Violation of this [a]rticle is a 
misdemeanor and is punishable by fine and/or confinement in the [county jail]pursuant to Section 
161.173 of the Local Government Code.”). 
245. See LOC. GOV’T § 161.201 (West Supp. 2012) (explaining the enforcement capabilities of 
the commission). 
246. See id. § 161.202 (describing the civil penalties for delay or violation of a commission 
order). 
247. See EL PASO CNTY., TEX., CODE OF ETHICS § 17.2.1 (2012), available at 
http://www.epcounty.com/ethicscom/documents/Code_of_Ethics.pdf (“A person who obtains access 
to confidential information under this chapter commits an offense if that person knowingly: uses the 
confidential information for a purpose other than the purpose for which the information was received 
or for a purpose unrelated to this chapter . . . .”). 
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IV. PRACTICAL ISSUES FACING ATTORNEYS 
The attorney interacting with government should be mindful of the 
various ways by which the lobby ordinances, rules, and statutes referenced 
above can create practical issues influencing advocacy at the local or state 
level. 
A. Engagement Structure 
Even the formation of the attorney–client relationship, including the 
responsibilities of the lawyer and the structure of the fee arrangement, can 
have implications depending on the jurisdiction.  As mentioned above, 
some local lobby ordinances—notably, those in San Antonio and Dallas—
look to the division of both duties and fees, as well as to the intent of the 
parties crafting the terms of engagement.248  If an attorney’s engagement 
includes both legal and local lobby services, the attorney should be mindful 
of the relevant distinctions when crafting the scope of the lawyer’s 
responsibilities.  If the representation involves legislative advocacy, the 
attorney may want to specify that disclosure of the client’s identity is likely 
to occur, regardless of the constraints envisioned by Texas Disciplinary 
Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.05.249  Similarly, the subject matter 
of the representation will likely have to be disclosed, as well as many of the 
efforts undertaken on the client’s behalf.250  Likewise, the nature of the 
fee arrangement may have to be disclosed depending on the 
jurisdiction.251  A client seeking a contingent fee arrangement should be 
advised as to whether such an agreement is permissible, and if so, whether 
it must be publicly disclosed.252 
The exceptions previously noted in Chapter 305 of the Texas 
Government Code allow an attorney to avoid registration only in limited 
situations, primarily those that already require the disclosure of the client 
 
248. E.g., SAN ANTONIO, TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 2, art. III, div. V, §§ 2-62 to 
2­71 (2012) (explicating the San Antonio Code of Ordinance’s requirements for lobbyists, including 
attorneys). 
249. See TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.05(a)–(c) (“A lawyer may reveal 
confidential information: (1) When the lawyer has been expressly authorized to do so in order to 
carry out the representation.  (2) When the client consents after consultation.”). 
250. See id. R. 1.05 cmt. 1 (urging the importance of full disclosure to the client prior to 
representation). 
251. Cf. id. R. 1.05 cmt. 15 (“A lawyer entitled to a fee necessarily must be permitted to prove 
the services rendered in an action to collect it, and this necessity is recognized by sub-paragraphs 
(c)(5) and (d)(2)(iv).  This aspect of the rule, in regard to privileged information, expresses the 
principle that the beneficiary of a fiduciary relationship may not exploit the relationship to the 
detriment of the fiduciary.”). 
252. See id. R. 1.04 (d) (detailing the requirements of attorney contingency fees). 
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relationship, such as administrative or legislative hearings and contested 
case hearings.253  In general, there is no broad exception for an attorney to 
utilize to maintain the confidentiality of the relationship or the details it 
encompasses. 
B. What Can Only Be Done by an Attorney? 
The local ordinances discussed above all recognize that there are certain 
functions that only licensed attorneys may perform and should not fall 
within the standard definition of lobbying.  However, none of the 
ordinances discussed above even attempts to provide any guidance as to the 
conduct that falls within this exception.  To discern what conduct can only 
rightly be engaged in by a licensed lawyer, practitioners must turn 
elsewhere. 
Somewhat surprisingly, neither the Texas Disciplinary Rules of 
Professional Conduct nor the Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure 
attempt to define the practice of law.  However, the state law governing 
the regulation of the legal profession (and the unauthorized practice of 
law) does offer some guidance.254  That statute defines the practice of law 
as:  
[T]he preparation of a pleading or other document incident to an action or 
special proceeding or the management of the action or proceeding on behalf 
of a client before a judge in court as well as a service rendered out of court, 
including the giving of advice or the rendering of any service requiring the 
use of legal skill or knowledge, such as preparing a will, contract, or other 
instrument, the legal effect of which under the facts and conclusions 
involved must be carefully determined.255  
So, in the context of advocating on a client’s behalf at city hall, what 
constitutes legal work?  Is the drafting of an ordinance something that only 
a licensed lawyer should do?  What about opining on the legal implications 
of a proposed city policy?  In case the definition set forth in section 
81.101(a) of the Texas Government Code does not provide enough 
 
253. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 305.003(b-1) (West 2012) (“Subsection (a)(2) does not 
require a member of the judicial, legislative, or executive branch of state government or an officer or 
employee of a political subdivision of the state to register.”). 
254. See id. § 81.101 (West 2005) (providing governance for the practice of law and 
unauthorized practice of law). 
255. See id. § 81.101(a)–(c) (“In this chapter, the ‘practice of law’ does not include the design, 
creation, publication, distribution, display, or sale, including publication, distribution, display, or sale 
by means of an Internet web site, of written materials, books, forms, computer software, or similar 
products if the products clearly and conspicuously state that the products are not a substitute for the 
advice of an attorney.”). 
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certainty, beware of section 81.101(b): “The definition in this section is 
not exclusive and does not deprive the judicial branch of the power and 
authority under both this chapter and the adjudicated cases to determine 
whether other services and acts not enumerated may constitute the practice 
of law.”256 
Thus, according to the Government Code, a person must be a lawyer to 
prepare a pleading or other document on behalf of a client in court, to 
render legal advice out of court, to prepare instruments requiring legal 
consideration, or to engage in any other quasi-legal conduct that some 
court may find to be overreaching at some later date.257  Compare that 
ambiguous guidance with the Texas Penal Code provision covering the 
unauthorized practice of law,258 which makes it a Class A misdemeanor 
for a person, “with intent to obtain an economic benefit for himself or 
herself,” to do any of the following:  
(1) contract[] with any person to represent that person with regard to 
personal causes of action for property damages or personal injury; 
(2) advise[] any person as to the person’s rights and the advisability of 
making claims for personal injuries or property damages; 
(3) advise[] any person as to whether or not to accept an offered sum of 
money in settlement of claims for personal injuries or property damages; 
(4) enter[] into a contract with another person to represent that person . . . 
on a contingent fee basis [;] or 
(5) enter[] into any contract with a third person which purports to grant the 
exclusive right to select and retain legal counsel . . . in any legal 
proceeding.259  
The prohibitions above do not apply to a person currently licensed to 
practice law in Texas or another jurisdiction.260 
While the Texas Government Code establishes the practice of law as the 
rendering of specialized legal services, the Texas Penal Code establishes the 
unauthorized practice of law as an attempt to enrich oneself in the realm of 
 
256. Id. § 81.101(b). 
257. See id. (granting the judiciary the ability to ascertain what does and does not constitute the 
practice of law). 
258. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.123 (West 2011) (including a graduated punishment 
system for repeat offenders, such as “under Subsection (a) of this section is a felony of the third 
degree if it is shown on the trial of the offense that the defendant has previously been convicted under 
Subsection (a) of this section”). 
259. See id. § 38.123(a) (describing the elements that constitute the “Unauthorized Practice of 
Law” in Texas). 
260. See id. § 38.123(b) (stating that such provision in the Texas Penal Code does not apply to 
any attorney in good standing with the State Bar of Texas or other valid jurisdiction). 
FISCHER_FINAL 6/3/2013  10:54 AM 
74 ST. MARY’S JOURNAL ON LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS [Vol. 3:32 
personal injury and property claims.261  Unfortunately, neither provision 
provides any meaningful guidance when attempting to determine whether 
an individual is “performing an act that may be performed only by a 
licensed attorney.”262 
V.     ETHICAL AND LEGAL ISSUES FACING ATTORNEYS 
A. State Bar Consequences 
In terms of reconciling state and local lobby regulations with an 
attorney’s ethical obligations, even the disclosure of a client’s identity is 
potentially problematic. 
Rule 1.05 of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct sets 
forth the guidelines for confidential and privileged information.263  
Confidential information not only includes privileged information264 but 
also unprivileged client information.265 
In 1991, the Professional Ethics Committee for the State Bar of Texas 
considered whether the Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct 
prevented an attorney from disclosing a client’s name and the fees owed by 
that client.266  The Committee looked at the then recently enacted 
expansion of the confidentiality rule, which clarified that both privileged 
and unprivileged client information were deemed confidential.267  The 
Committee also looked at the restrictions imposed by the law of agency on 
 
261. See id. § 38.123(a) (establishing the circumstances under which a person will be guilty of 
engaging in the unauthorized practice of law and focusing on personal injury and property disputes). 
262. E.g., SAN ANTONIO, TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 2, art. III, div. V, § 2-64(9) 
(2012) (asserting the attorney exception included in the list of persons who are not required to 
register as lobbyists). 
263. See TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.05 (dictating Texas guidelines 
and limitations on a client’s confidential information). 
264. Id. R. 1.05(a) (identifying two types of confidential information and providing that 
“‘[p]rivileged information’ refers to the information of a client protected by the lawyer–client 
privilege of Rule 503 of the Texas Rules of Criminal Evidence or . . . Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence”). 
265. Id. R. 1.05(a) (including information acquired by a lawyer relating to or “furnished by the 
client other than privileged information” (emphasis added)). 
266. See Tex. Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. No. 479 (1991) (addressing “whether the Texas 
Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct prohibit the disclosure of” client names or “the amounts 
owed by each client” where the information is requested from the firm to secure a loan); see also TEX. 
DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.05 cmt. 15 (“A lawyer entitled to a fee necessarily 
must be permitted to prove the services rendered in an action to collect it.”). 
267. See TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.05 (providing privileged and 
unprivileged information are appropriately categorized as confidential information); See also Tex. 
Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. No. 479 (1991) (“In contrast to the former rule . . . [Disciplinary Rule 
1.05] provides increased protection by expanding the scope of confidentiality.”). 
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an attorney acting “in his or her capacity as fiduciary.”268  In its analysis, 
the Committee found that the names of a client and the amounts they 
owed constituted confidential information.269  In conclusion, “[a]bsent a 
client’s informed consent, [a] law firm may not reveal either the names of 
its client or the amounts which those clients owe.”270 
In light of this cautionary guidance, an attorney should approach 
governmental advocacy with care.  When it becomes clear to attorneys that 
they will be subject to a local lobby ordinance or the state Lobby Law, 
should the first order of business be to gain consent to disclose the client’s 
identity?  Similarly, if the professional ethics committee has deemed it 
improper to disclose amounts owed by a client to an attorney, does that 
same logic apply to the disclosure of a contingent fee arrangement?  A 
careful practitioner should not only get consent to reveal the client’s 
identity, but also seek permission to reveal any relevant details of the fee 
structure.271  Otherwise, the advocate’s first act of compliance—
registering as a lobbyist—could simultaneously constitute an ethical 
breach.272 
B. Rule 4.02: Communications with One Represented by Counsel 
One of the more complicated and uncharted ethical consequences 
stemming from local lobby ordinances is the issue of reconciling how 
communication with city officials is treated by local ordinance and how it 
is viewed by the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct.273  
There appears to be an inherent conflict between a regulatory structure 
that regulates such communication through disclosure and a system that 
essentially prohibits such communication. 
 
268. Tex. Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. No. 479 (1991) (“[A] lawyer’s obligation of 
confidentiality springs not so much from the attorney–client evidentiary privilege as it does from the 
Law of Agency.”). 
269. See id. (“Application of the rule prohibits the law firm from disclosing the requested 
information.”). 
270. Id. 
271. See TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.05 (prohibiting the disclosure of 
confidential information and providing for limited exceptions to the rule); Tex. Comm. on Prof'l 
Ethics, Op. No. 479 (1991) (“Absent a client’s informed consent, the law firm may not reveal either 
the names of its clients or the amounts which those clients owe.”). 
272. See generally TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 305.003 (West 2005) (outlining who is required 
to register as a lobbyist). 
273. Compare TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.02 (stating a lawyer must 
not communicate with an entity of government that the lawyer knows is represented by counsel 
about his client’s representation), with Tex. Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. No. 474 (1991) 
(concluding Rule 4.02 prohibited plaintiff’s counsel from communicating with city council 
members). 
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Rule 4.02 is “meant ‘to prevent lawyers from taking advantage of 
uncounselled lay persons and to preserve the integrity of the lawyer–client 
relationship.’”274  Rule 4.02 states in relevant part:  
(a) In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate or cause or 
encourage another to communicate about the subject of the representation 
with a person, organization or entity of government the lawyer knows to be 
represented by another lawyer regarding that subject, unless the lawyer has 
the consent of the other lawyer or is authorized by law to do so. 
(b) In representing a client a lawyer shall not communicate or cause another 
to communicate about the subject of representation with a person or 
organization a lawyer knows to be employed or retained for the purpose of 
conferring with or advising another lawyer about the subject of the 
representation, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer or is 
authorized by law to do so. 
(c) For the purpose of this rule, “organization or entity of government” 
includes: (1) those persons presently having a managerial responsibility with 
an organization or entity of government that relates to the subject of the 
representation, or (2) those persons presently employed by such organization 
or entity and whose act or omission in connection with the subject of 
representation may make the organization or entity of government 
vicariously liable for such act or omission.275  
In 1991, the Professional Ethics Committee of the State Bar of Texas 
found Rule 4.02 prohibits a lawyer representing a party in litigation 
against a city from communicating with an individual city council member 
about the proposed settlement of the litigation.276 
Most Texas case law interpreting Rule 4.02 deals with communications 
made while litigation was pending and does little to illuminate the 
propriety of communications between private attorneys and city officials 
regarding matters of public policy.277  The language of the rule and the 
 
274. Graham v. United States, 96 F.3d 446, 449 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting MODEL RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.2 cmt. (1992)); see also TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 
4.02 cmt. 1 (“Paragraph (a) of this Rule is directed at efforts to circumvent the lawyer–client 
relationship existing between other persons, organizations[,] or entities of government and their 
respective counsel.”); Tex. Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. No. 474 (1991) (establishing Rule 4.02 
“prohibit[s] communication by a lawyer for one party concerning the subject of the representation 
with persons having a managerial responsibility on behalf of the organization that relates to the 
subject matter of the representation”). 
275. TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.02. 
276. Tex. Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. No. 474 (1991). 
277. See, e.g., In re News Am. Pub., Inc., 974 S.W.2d 97, 97 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998, 
no pet.) (finding sanctions were appropriate under Rule 4.02 for actions in a suit for breach of 
contract where plaintiff’s counsel met with a party who unilaterally terminated his attorney–client 
relationship). 
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commentary that follows makes it clear that an attorney may communicate 
with one represented by counsel about the subject of the representation 
only in limited situations: when opposing counsel consents to the 
communication or when authorized to do so by law.278 
With the exception of San Antonio, which expressly incorporates Rule 
4.02 into its lobby regulations,279 the other local lobby ordinances do not 
require the consent of the city attorney and clearly anticipate a lawyer–
lobbyist communicating with city officials.280  Thus, does a local lobby 
ordinance constitute an authorization by law for the purposes of Rule 
4.02?  While no formal answer exists, we may be able to glean guidance 
from other sources. 
The Texas Attorney General considered Rule 4.02 in light of an 
administrative rule requiring written communications be delivered to an 
opposing party, as well as the party’s counsel.281  The attorney general was 
asked about the interplay of Rule 4.02 and a rule adopted by the Texas 
Workers’ Compensation Commission, which requires all written 
communications relating to a claim be delivered to the claimant’s legal 
counsel, as well as the claimant.282  The attorney general sought to 
determine whether the commission rule, found in the Texas 
Administrative Code, was a “law” that would authorize such 
communication.283  The opinion concluded an administrative rule is a 
law, provided it is authorized by statute, is within the authority of the 
agency, and was adopted in a procedurally correct manner.284  
 
278. See TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.02(a) (restricting contact between 
an attorney and opposing counsel’s client to instances where consent is secured from opposing 
counsel or the contact is otherwise authorized). 
279. SAN ANTONIO, TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 2, art. III, div. V, § 2-64(5) (2012) 
(stating “[a]n attorney . . . whose contact with a city official is made solely as part of resolving a 
dispute with the city, provided that the contact is solely with city officials who do not vote on or have 
final authority . . . and so long as such an attorney complies with Rule 4.02,” does not have to 
register). 
280. See, e.g., HOUS., TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 18, art. V, § 18-72(b) (2012) 
(establishing an individual that is required to register and “communicates directly with a member of 
the executive branch to influence administrative action is not required to register” if the individual 
performs acts as a licensed attorney). 
281. See Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. No. JC­0572 (2002) (addressing “whether a Workers’ 
Compensation Commission . . . rule requiring that written communications be sent to both a 
claimant and the claimant’s attorney creates an exception to Rule 4.02(a)”). 
282. See id. (comparing Rule 4.02(a) with Workers’ Compensation Commission Rule 
102.4(b), which requires certain information be mailed to the claimant and her representative). 
283. See id. (“Rule 4.02(a) bars communication with clients ‘unless the lawyer . . . is authorized 
by law to do so.’”). 
284. Id. (“[A]dministrative regulations only have the full force and effect of law when: (1) a 
statute exists which authorized the issuance of rules and regulations by the agency; (2) the rule or 
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Additionally, the attorney general opined “that the Commission rule is [a] 
‘law’ authorizing an attorney to send a written communication to a person 
who is represented by counsel and that it provides an exception to Rule 
4.02(a).”285 
In reaching this opinion, the attorney general relied on the reasoning set 
forth in Lee v. Fenwick,286 which dealt with the proper calculation of 
prejudgment interest.287  The issue before the court was whether the 
defendant received written notice of the claim, as required by statute, when 
plaintiff’s counsel had merely notified defendant’s attorney, but not the 
defendant himself.288  The court dispensed with the argument that Rule 
4.02 prohibits direct communication with a defendant represented by 
counsel.289  The court focused on the exception created by the language in 
Rule 4.02, noting that the general prohibition applies “unless the lawyer . . . 
is authorized by law to do so,” and concluded, “Since [the statute] requires 
written notice to the defendant, an attorney would not violate Disciplinary 
Rule 4.02 by sending the statutory notice.”290 
However, these authorities deal with situations where an attorney is 
procedurally required to communicate in writing with another party, not 
with the sort of strategic oral communication most often associated with 
lobbying.  The local lobby ordinances do not require communication, but 
merely permit communication and mandate that it be disclosed.291  
Clearly, an ordinance regulating lobbyists is within the lawful jurisdiction 
of a home rule municipality and should be considered a law complete with 
criminal penalties.292  The question that remains unanswered is whether a 
 
regulation adopted is within the authority of the agency; and (3) the rule or regulation is adopted 
according to the procedure prescribed by statute.”). 
285. Id. 
286. Lee v. Fenwick, 907 S.W.2d 88 (Tex. App.—Eastland 1995, writ denied). 
287. Compare id. at 88 (discussing whether the defendant received communications from the 
plaintiff about the claim before suit was filed and awarding “prejudgment interest from the date the 
lawsuit was filed,” because the defendant did not receive notice), with Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. No. 
JC­0572 (2002) (relying on the decision in Lee v. Fenwick to conclude that a statutory exception 
exists to Rule 4.02). 
288. Lee, 907 S.W.2d at 89–90 (examining the argument that receipt of notice by a party’s 
counsel is conclusive of the fact that the party received notice). 
289. See id. at 90 (dismissing the plaintiff’s argument by noting that an exemption to Rule 4.02 
exists where there is a statutory notice requirement). 
290. Id. 
291. See, e.g., HOUS., TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 18, art. V, § 18-72 (2012) (discussing 
registration when a party makes certain communications, but not mandating the party make 
communications). 
292. See, e.g., id. (establishing reporting requirements for lobbyists conducting communications 
in the City of Houston). 
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local lobby ordinance that grants restricted permission to communicate 
with city officials outside the presence of their attorneys is legal 
authorization, which brings those discussions outside the scope of Rule 
4.02. 
C. Regulating Conflicts of Interest 
As noted, state Lobby Law contains statutory provisions for lobbyists 
whose clients develop conflicting interests.293  These restrictions are in 
addition to—not in lieu of—the conflict of interest rules governing 
attorneys.294  This means a lawyer who is lobbying at the state level is 
equally subject to both standards for conflicts of interests, each with its 
own method of addressing the conflict.  Although the lobby conflicts 
provisions of the Government Code have not yet made their way into local 
lobby ordinances, practitioners should be aware of the two systems and 
their distinctions.  The two procedures differ in the notice required,295 the 
disclosure of a conflict,296 and the ability of the clients to consent to a 
conflict of interest.297 
Rule 1.06 of the Texas Disciplinary Rules governs conflicts of interests 
between clients.298  Generally, a lawyer may not represent a client if it 
reasonably appears the client’s interests are materially and directly adverse 
to the interests of another client or to the lawyer himself.299  A lawyer may 
engage in the dual representation if the lawyer reasonably believes the dual 
representation will not materially affect either client and after full 
disclosure of the conflict—and its potential consequences—each client 
consents to the dual representation.300  If the conflict is incurable, the 
lawyer should withdraw from one or more representations as necessary to 
 
293. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 305.028 (West 2005) (identifying prohibited conflicts of 
interest under the state Lobby Law). 
294. TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.06 (providing the general rule for 
conflicts of interest). 
295. Compare GOV’T § 305.028(c)(2) (describing the requirement to file conflicts with the 
Commission), with TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.06 (omitting notice to 
anyone other than each affected client). 
296. Compare GOV’T § 305.028(c)(2) (requiring client disclosure within two business days of 
discovering the conflict), with TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.06(c)(2) 
(detailing the required disclosure of the conflict to the client). 
297. Compare GOV’T § 305.028(c-1)(2) (allowing an attorney to represent a client despite a 
conflict of interest if the attorney does not “reasonably believe[] the representation of each client will 
be materially affected” and if the client consents), with TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT R. 1.06(c) (requiring the consent of “each affected or potentially affected client”). 
298. TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.06. 
299. Id. R. 1.06(b). 
300. Id. R. 1.06(c). 
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avoid a violation of the rules. 
The Lobby Law borrows liberally from Rule 1.06, but specifies written 
notice to affected clients and requires disclosure of the conflict to a third 
party.  Section 305.028 of the Government Code sets out the conflict of 
interest provisions applicable to lobbyists.301  It provides that a lobbyist 
may not represent two clients with interests that are “materially and 
directly adverse,” nor may he represent a client when the representation 
“reasonably appears to be adversely limited” by the lobbyist’s own interests 
or obligation to another client.302  To properly address a conflict, the 
lobbyist must reasonably believe “the representation of each client will not 
be materially affected,” must notify each client in writing within two 
business days of becoming aware of the conflict, and must provide written 
notice to the Texas Ethics Commission of the existence of the conflict 
within ten days.303  Once this notice is accomplished, there is no 
permission necessary from the clients to continue the representation.304 
However, if the lobbyist determines that the dual representation 
reasonably appears to materially affect the representation, both clients must 
consent to the continuing lobby representation, thereby waiving the 
lobbyist’s conflict.305  When a conflict arises that the procedures in the 
statute do not satisfactorily address, the lobbyist must withdraw from 
representation as necessary to cure the conflict.306  Violations are subject 
to civil penalty and revocation of lobby credentials by the Ethics 
Commission, and lobbyists are under an ongoing obligation to swear they 
have complied with Section 305.028.307 
D. Penal Code Consequences 
As noted earlier, one of the statutory exceptions to the Texas Penal 
Code’s gift prohibition is for food, lodging, transportation, and 
entertainment that is both (1) accepted as a guest, and (2) reported as 
required by law.308  In order to take advantage of this exception, both the 
donor and donee must meet relevant reporting requirements, which may 
vary depending on the jurisdiction.  An attorney must not only know the 
 
301. GOV’T § 305.028. 
302. Id. § 305.028(b). 
303. Id. § 305.028(c)(1)–(3). 
304. Id. § 305.028(c-1). 
305. Id. § 305.028(c-1)(2). 
306. Id. § 305.028(d). 
307. Id. § 305.028(f)–(h). 
308. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 36.10(b) (West Supp. 2012) (noting the inapplicability of 
offense statutes for gifts to public servants where reporting requirements are met). 
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local reporting requirements, but also the reporting requirements of the 
local official who is the recipient of the goodwill. 
It is evident the activity reports required by each municipality discussed 
herein mandate the report of any expenditures made in the course of 
lobbying, including expenditures for food, lodging, transportation, and 
entertainment.309  However, to avoid implicating the state law’s gift 
prohibitions for such expenditures, the local official must also report those 
benefits as required by any local ordinance.310 
This means, to enjoy the protection conferred by section 36.10 of the 
Penal Code, an advocate must first ensure he is meeting the local reporting 
requirements.  For example, in Dallas and San Antonio, the definition of 
“gift” is broad enough to include food, lodging, transportation, and 
entertainment.311  A local lobbyist in Dallas must report gifts, benefits, or 
expenditures with a cumulative value of over $25 and must specify the 
date, cost, and circumstances of the transaction.312  In San Antonio, 
quarterly activity reports must include “[e]ach gift, benefit, or expenditure 
greater than [$50].”313  In Houston, a lobbyist must report any gift, 
expenditure, or honorarium over $250.314  The City of Austin requires its 
lobbyists to report expenditures, gifts, or honoraria of $100 or more made 
to benefit a city official, along with the “date, beneficiary, amount[,] and 
circumstances of the transaction.”315  In El Paso, lobbyists must include 
gifts, including meals and entertainment costs, in quarterly reports.316 
While it is imperative that attorneys be familiar with the local lobby 
 
309. See, e.g., SAN ANTONIO, TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 2, art. III, div. V, § 2-66 
(2012) (requiring quarterly activity reports for lobbying activities, which shall include gifts, benefits, 
or expenditures). 
310. See, e.g., DALL., TEX., CITY CODE ch. 12A, art. I, § 12A-15.6 (2012) (providing 
guidelines for required disclosures by lobbyists in form, manner, and substance). 
311. See SAN ANTONIO, TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 2, art. III, div. V, § 2-42 (2012) 
(defining gift as “a voluntary transfer of property (including the payment of money) or the conferral 
of a benefit having pecuniary value (such as the rendition of services or the forbearance of collection 
on a debt), unless consideration of equal or greater value is received by the donor”); see also DALL., 
TEX., CITY CODE ch. 12A, art. I, § 12A-2(21) (2012) (specifying a gift is “a voluntary transfer of 
property (including the payment of money) or the conferral of a benefit having pecuniary value”). 
312. See DALL., TEX., CITY CODE ch. 12A, art. III, § 12A-15.6(a) (2012) (mandating “each 
registrant [lobbyist] shall file with the city secretary a report concerning the registrant’s lobbying 
activities for each client from whom, or with respect to whom, the registrant received compensation 
of, or expended, monies for”). 
313. SAN ANTONIO, TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 2, art. III, div. V, § 2-66(a)(6) (2012). 
314. HOUS., TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 18, art. V, § 18-75(a)(3) (2012). 
315. AUSTIN, TEX., CITY CODE tit. 4, ch. 4-8, § 4-8-7(3) (2012). 
316. See EL PASO, TEX., MUN. CODE tit. 2, ch. 2.94, § 2.94.070(A)(7) (2012) (stating all gifts 
“must be reported pursuant to Section 2.92.070(B),” which delineates in greater detail what gifts are 
reportable). 
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disclosure requirements, it is not sufficient to know only the local 
disclosure requirements; an attorney must be well versed in the city’s 
corresponding code of ethics applicable to its various public officers.  The 
City of Dallas Code of Ethics has specific reporting requirements related to 
travel.317  A Dallas city official must file a disclosure statement after 
accepting any trip or excursion in connection with that person’s official 
duties, and the disclosure must include “the gratuitous provision of 
transportation, accommodations, entertainment, meals, or 
refreshments.”318  The disclosure must also include the sponsor name, the 
person funding the trip, the place to be visited, the date of the trip, and the 
purpose of the travel.319  If time permits, such disclosure must be made 
prior to the excursion; otherwise, it must be reported within seven days 
after the travel is concluded.320 
In San Antonio, city officials may not accept any gift from a registered 
lobbyist, except for meals of less than $50 per occurrence, so long as the 
city official does not accept more than $500 in a calendar year from a 
single source.321  San Antonio also requires a city official’s financial 
disclosure report include the name of each person giving the city official or 
the official’s spouse a gift with a fair market value of $100 or more.322  In 
Houston, the financial disclosures required of city officials include the 
identification of any person or business that donates a gift worth more 
than $250, but it specifically excludes food and beverages from the 
reporting requirement.323 
In the City of Austin, the mayor and council members are required to 
make multiple disclosures when they accept any trip or excursion from a 
person or entity other than the city.324  Before embarking on a trip or 
excursion, the elected official must notify the city clerk of the sponsor’s 
name and the place visited, as well as the date, purpose, and duration of 
the trip.325  Upon returning, the official must report the approximate 
 
317. See DALL., TEX., CITY CODE ch. 12A, art. III-A, § 12A-21 (2012) (detailing a number of 
travel reporting requirements that must be followed by certain persons). 
318. Id. § 12A-21(a). 
319. Id. § 12A-21(a)(1)–(4). 
320. Id.§ 12A-21(a). 
321. SAN ANTONIO, TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 2, art. III, div. II, § 2-45(a)(2) (2012). 
322. Id. div. VII, § 2-74(14). 
323. HOUS., TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 18, art. V, § 18-21(g)(6) (2012).  
Interestingly, this places the burden upon city officials to determine the value of a benefit for which 
they did not pay.  There is no guidance for city officials as to whether they must verify the value of 
such a benefit, or which valuation method (fair market, face value, etc.) should be utilized. 
324. AUSTIN, TEX., CITY CODE tit. 2, ch. 2-7, § 2-7-72(F) (2012). 
325. Id. 
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value of the trip.326  Thus, to avail oneself of the “food, lodging, 
transportation” defense, Austin advocates and officials must ensure the trip 
has been reported on the lobbyist’s quarterly activity report and twice by 
the elected official.327 
El Paso has the most specific reporting provision, requiring city officials 
to report “[a]ny hosting, such as travel and expenses, entertainment, meals 
or refreshments, that has a value of more than [$50], other than hosting 
provided on account of kinship or a personal, professional, or business 
relationship independent of the official status of the recipient.”328  The El 
Paso city ordinance goes on to require reporting of “[a]ny tickets or other 
admission passes to any event with an actual or face value of more than 
[$10] . . . except for tickets or admission passes provided by the City for an 
event that is sponsored or conducted by the City.”329 
What remains unclear is how each of the aforementioned local limits on 
gifts will be reconciled with section 36.10(6) of the Texas Penal Code.330  
The Penal Code exception to the gift prohibitions authorizes gifts with a 
value of less than $50.331  It is not difficult to envision a scenario where a 
public official reports the acceptance of a gift prohibited by the Penal Code 
in an attempt to comply with a local disclosure requirement. 
E. Negative Consequences to Be Considered by the Local Governmental 
 Practitioner 
The attempt to reconcile both state and local lobbying regulations with 
an attorney’s ethical obligations is further complicated by provisions found 
in the Texas Government Code and the Texas Penal Code.  The Penal 
Code offers limited deference to transactions reported in accordance with 
the state Lobby Law.  Nevertheless, the advent of local lobby regulations 
serves to complicate rather than simplify the standards imposed by the 
Penal Code. 
Perhaps the area of greatest risk to the local government lobby 
practitioner is the uncertainty surrounding the bribery statute found in 
 
326. Id. 
327. See id. § 2-7-72(G) (stating any city official must promptly report to the city manager any 
gift or loan accepted); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 36.10(b) (West Supp. 2012) (outlining the 
inapplicability of section 36.08, which may subject a public servant to a penal offense, to “food, 
lodging, [and] transportation” that is reported by the done and accepted as a guest). 
328. EL PASO, TEX., MUN. CODE tit. 2, ch. 2.92, § 2.92.070(B)(4)(b) (2012). 
329. Id. § 2.92.070(B)(4)(d). 
330. PENAL § 36.10(a)(6) (West Supp. 2012). 
331. Id. (disallowing application of section 36.08 to “an item with a value of less than $50, 
excluding cash or a negotiable instrument”). 
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section 36.02 of the Texas Penal Code.332  While the exceptions found in 
section 36.10333 specifically reference sections 36.08 and 36.09, there is 
no application of the language found in section 36.10 to the bribery 
provisions in section 36.02. 
For discussion purposes, the most relevant portion of section 36.02 
reads as follows:  
(a) A person commits an offense if he intentionally or knowingly offers, 
confers, or agrees to confer on another, or solicits, accepts, or agrees to accept 
from another: 
  (1) any benefit as consideration for the recipient’s decision, opinion, 
recommendation, vote, or other exercise of discretion as a public servant, 
party official, or voter; 
. . . . 
(d) It is an exception to the application of Subdivisions (1), (2), and (3) of 
Subsection (a) that the benefit is a political contribution as defined by Title 
15, Election Code, or an expenditure made and reported in accordance with 
Chapter 305, Government Code. 
(e) An offense under this section is a felony of the second degree.334  
The only exceptions to prosecution for the felony offense of improper 
offering of a benefit to a public servant include when the benefit was a 
political contribution or was an expenditure made under the Lobby Law, 
Chapter 305 of the Government Code.335  Because the Lobby Law does 
not apply to local government public servants, there is no exception for 
such benefits.336  The offense is complete with the singular act of offering 
or soliciting any benefit as consideration; thus, there is no acceptance or 
quid pro quo required.337  The practical outcome is that at the state level, 
a registrant may make expenditures without being subject to the provision 
as long as the registrant reports the expenditure.  At the local level, 
however, there is no safe harbor, and the local district attorney may 
prosecute the violation.  The cautious practitioner would be well advised to 
counsel clients to be very careful when determining whether to make any 
 
332. PENAL § 36.02 (West 2011). 
333. Id. § 36.10 (West Supp. 2012). 
334. Id. § 36.02 (West 2011). 
335. Id. § 36.02(d). 
336. See Tex. Ethics Comm’n Op. No. 427, at 2 (2000) (stating Lobby Law restrictions and 
exceptions only apply to officers or employees “of the legislative or executive branch of state 
government”). 
337. See, e.g., Hubbard v. State, 668 S.W.2d 419, 420–21 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1984) (“The 
offense focuses on the mental state of the actor, and is complete if a private citizen, by offering, 
conferring, or agreeing to confer, or a public servant or party official, by soliciting, accepting, or 
agreeing to accept, intends an agreement.” (citing Minter v. State, 159 S.W. 286 (Tex. Crim. App. 
1913))), pet. granted, remanded on other grounds, 739 S.W.2d 341 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987). 
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expenditure involving a local public official or government employee. 
There are other areas of incongruity found in state law impacting 
advocacy practitioners at the local level.  This is primarily seen in statutes 
adopted to provide exceptions to state officials and employees, but which 
were not extended to local officials. 
For example, section 572.060 of the Texas Government Code provides 
that a state officer or employee may solicit a contribution to a charity or 
government entity without running the risk of that becoming a benefit 
under the Penal Code honorarium or gift provisions, Lobby Law, or the 
Title 15 campaign law.338  The same protection could have been codified 
for local officials and employees but it was not; as a result, these persons 
were left subject to the interpretation of the commission that the 
contribution as solicited could become an impermissible benefit under the 
Penal Code.339 
VI.     IN CONCLUSION 
In a world of increasing transparency and scrutiny on the public 
policymaking process, there is likely to be an increasing number of 
jurisdictions that will adopt local lobby regulations.  Currently, there is no 
model ordinance; as a result, the local practitioner will not only have to 
monitor any changes at the state level that might influence local 
governmental lobby practices, but also all municipalities as well.  
Furthermore, in 2013, the Texas Legislature will consider statutory 
changes to the jurisdiction of the Texas Ethics Commission, including 
Chapter 305 of the Government Code.340  Due to the rules of 
professional conduct and the increasing efforts for greater transparency and 
disclosure, the lawyer–lobbyist will face significant challenges in ethically 
and proficiently representing clients.  The attorney who chooses to serve as 
both a legal advocate and a policymaking advocate will be subjected to 
competing layers of regulatory oversight, including the Texas Disciplinary 
Rules of Professional Conduct, state or local lobby restrictions, and the 
provisions of the Texas Penal Code.  Each of these standards has its own 
restrictions, exceptions, interpretive guidance, and potential consequences.  
Recognizing and reconciling these normative and legal standards will be 
paramount for the ethical attorney. 
 
 
338. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN., tit. 5, subtit. B, § 572.060 (West 2012). 
339. Tex. Ethics Comm’n Op. No. 427, at 1 (2000). 
340. Report of the Texas Sunset Advisory Comm. on the Texas Ethics Comm’n, at 1, 26 
(2012). 
